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Our Wealth Transfer Tax System –
A View from the 100th Year*
Carlyn S. McCaffrey & John C. McCaffrey
All taxes upon the transference of property of every kind, so far as they
diminish the capital value of that property, tend to diminish the funds
destined for the maintenance of productive labour. They are all more or
less unthrifty taxes that increase the revenue of the sovereign, which seldom maintains any but unproductive labourers at the expense of the capital of the people, which maintains none but productive.1
Thank you Cathy and thanks to all of you, not only for being here
this morning but for being part of this organization that means so much
to so many of us. My 34-year membership in ACTEC has played a very
important role in the development of my professional career. It provides the forum of choice for many of us to share ideas to develop new
ones and to form lasting friendships.
This morning I want to share with you some of my thoughts about
our federal wealth transfer tax system – past, present and possible future. The system, now in its 100th year, is a shadow of what it was back
in the 1970s when many of us began to practice.
In 1956 Louis Eisenstein told Congress that “the estate tax. . . is in a
period of decline. Unlike its predicament in the Mellon era, [when Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon came close to achieving its repeal]2 the
present problem is not so much sudden death as chronic illness.”3 If Mr.
* This speech has been published in the ACTEC Law Journal. Subsequent
publication of portions of this speech will appear in the book, Structuring the Tax
Consequences of Marriage and Divorce.
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 814 (Edwin Cannan ed., University of Chicago Press 1976) (1776).
2 See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
3 Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223,
255-256 (1956) (originally prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on Tax Policy of
the Joint Committee on the Economic Report and first appearing in FED. TAX POL’Y FOR
ECON. GROWTH & STABILITY, J. COMM. ON THE ECON. REP., 84TH CONG., (J. Comm.
Print 1955)). This article is indebted to Mr. Eisenstein’s work. Many of the historical
citations originated with his paper. See Terrance O’Reilly, Tax Legal Scholarship To
1970, 34 VA. TAX REV. 269, 306 (2014) (Mr. Eisenstein “produced some of the most
erudite tax law scholarship from the mid 1940s to the mid 1960s.”); see, e.g., LOUIS EISENSTEIN, THE IDEOLOGIES OF TAXATION (1961). See also Abe Fortas, In Memory of Louis
Eisenstein, 22 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (1966-1967).
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Eisenstein were writing in 2015, he would likely tell us that after a short
recovery in the 70s, it lapsed back into a chronic illness that led to a
near-death experience and it did not have a strong recovery. Is a struggle to rehabilitate it worthwhile? Should we rage against its decline or
should we let it go gentle into that good night?4
John Wallace’s 2001 Trachtman lecture focused on this subject 14
years ago,5 three months before President Bush signed the Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA), the bill that
would eventually lead to the one year quasi-repeal of our wealth transfer tax system.6 But much has happened since then, and I hope that this
is a subject that you continue to find interesting.
I’ll talk first about the past.
THE PAST
Our current wealth transfer tax system was, for all intents and purposes, battle-born on September 8, 1916, a few months before the
United States joined World War I on April 6, 1917.7 The 1916 Estate
tax was not Congress’s first attempt to tax gratuitous transmissions of
property. It had experimented with these kinds of taxes several times
before in response to truly dire revenue needs. In 1797 the very young
federal government faced a fiscal crisis due to an undeclared war with
France. To raise the needed revenue, Congress passed the Stamp Act of
1797,8 imposing duties on paper used for certain legal instruments, including licenses to practice law and receipts for legacies and intestate
shares. The tax on the latter was equal to two-tenths of one percent on
amounts in excess of $500 and did not apply to the value of assets passing to wives, children and grandchildren.9 The tax lasted less than five
4

See DYLAN THOMAS, Do Not Go Gentle into that Good Night, in IN COUNTRY
OTHER POEMS 18 (1952).
5 John A. Wallace, A View Through a Glass Darkly: The Impact of Transfer Tax
Repeal on Trusts and Estates Lawyers, 27 ACTEC L.J. 6, 6 (2001) (this is the text of the
Annual Joseph Trachtman Memorial Lecture delivered by ACTEC Past President John
A. Wallace at the Annual Meeting in Boca Raton, Florida, in March 2001).
6 EGTRRA was signed by President George W. Bush on June 7, 2001. Economic
Growth & Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001).
7 See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION § 1.02, at 6
(1942).
8 Act of July 6, 1797 (Stamp Act of 1797), 1 Stat. 527, 5 Cong. Ch. 11 (1797).
9 The Act stated,
[T]here shall be levied, collected and paid throughout the United States, the
several stamp duties following, to wit: For every skin or piece of vellum, or
parchment, or sheet or piece of paper upon which shall be written or printed
any or either of . . . any receipt or discharge for or on account of any legacy left
by any will or other testamentary instrument, or for any share or part of a personal estate divided by force of any statute of distributions, the amount whereof
SLEEP
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years. It was repealed in 1802 shortly after the United States signed a
treaty with France.10
The next crisis that forced Congress to impose death taxes11 was the
Civil War. An inheritance tax was enacted as part of the Internal Reveshall be above the value of fifty dollars, and shall not exceed the value of one
hundred dollars, twenty-five cents; where the amount thereof shall exceed the
value of one hundred dollars and shall not exceed five hundred dollars, fifty
cents; and for every further sum of five hundred dollars, the additional sum of
one dollar; . . . Provided, that nothing in this act contained, shall extend to
charge with a duty, any legacy left by any will or other testamentary instrument
or any share or part of a personal estate to be divided by force of any statute of
distributions which shall be left to, or divided amongst the wife, children or
grandchildren of the person deceased intestate, or making such will or testamentary instrument.
Id. at 527-28.
10 Appropriation for the Expense of Carrying into Effect the Convention with
France, Act of April 6, 1802, 2 Stat. 148, 7 Cong. Ch. 19; Convention Between the French
Republic and the United States, 8 Stat. 178 (1800).
11 The phrase “death tax” occasions great umbrage from certain authors. See, e.g.,
DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX
SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH—AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE 81 (2003) (“The
term death tax is a superb example of marketing triumphing over reasoned debate. So
thoroughly has the phrase been infused into Washington that many journalists . . . employ
this term of advocacy instead of the neutral, and correct, term estate tax. . .”); Peter
Baker, Republicans in the House Pass Repeal of Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 2015 at
A20 (“The vote was the first in a decade to eliminate what Republicans call the death
tax. . .”); Daniel W. Matthews, A Fight To The Death: Slaying the Estate Tax Repeal
Hydra, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 663, 671 (“The phrase ‘death tax’ is emblematic of how the
fight over estate tax repeal became one of political marketing, rather than tax policy.”
(citing MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT
OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 8, 76 (2005); and WILLIAM H. GATES SR. & CHUCK
COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH: WHY AMERICANS SHOULD TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES 57 (2002), who imply that the use of this phrase is a modern conservative conspiracy)). Despite the suggestion that the phrase “death tax” was coined as
a marketing device to assist repeal efforts, the phrase has been used for many years as an
accurate way to describe taxes, whether “estate,” “accessions,” “legacy,” “successions,”
“inheritance,” “stamp” taxes on legal documents required to transfer property (see supra
note 9), or what have you, that are imposed as a result of a taxpayer’s death (as it is used
in the sentence in the text accompanying this note). This phrase has an impeccable pedigree that comfortably predates 21st century repeal efforts: see, e.g. Senator Thomas C.
Plaat (R-NY) 26 CONG. REC. 6821 (1894) (“death duties are very odious.”); Ruckgaber v.
Moore, 104 F. 947, 951 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1900) (“the theory of a death tax is that it is a
limitation upon the power of disposition.”); Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 223 (“Death taxes
are ancient taxes.”); Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 235 n.72 (“Herbert Hoover had also
praised death taxation as a leveler of hereditary wealth.”); Eisenstein, supra note 3, at
237 n.87 (“I have failed to mention, for example, the repeated efforts to abolish the estate
tax on the ground that death taxes fall within the fiscal province of the states.”); REPORTS
TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, FEDERAL AND STATE
DEATH TAXES, 73rd Cong. (1933); PAUL, supra note 7, at 3 n.1 (“for an excellent history
of death taxation . . . ”); PAUL, supra note 7, at 4 n.8 (“For a more extended account of
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nue Act of 1862 to finance the war. The tax was imposed on the legacies
of a decedent whose personal property, including lifetime gifts intended
to take possession at death, was worth more than $1,000.12 The rates
were much higher than the Stamp Act’s rates, but very low by today’s
standards. Once the $1,000 threshold was reached, the tax rates ranged
from a low of .75% for property passing to issue, ancestors and siblings
to a high of 5% for property passing to others. No tax was imposed on
property passing from one spouse to the other.13 The 1862 Act also
imposed a small stamp tax on the probate of wills and letters of
administration.
In 1864, Congress increased the inheritance tax rates to a new minimum of 1% and a new high of 6% and imposed an additional tax on
succession to real estate.14 For this purpose, the term “succession” included lifetime gifts, the passage of property at the termination of a life
estate and at the death of a joint tenant. Curiously, the tax provided an
exemption for property passing to a widow but not property passing to a
widower. The failure to exempt a widower’s share led to the first constitutional challenge of a federal inheritance tax. The text of the 1864 statute is interesting because some of its language remains in our current
law. When a grantor transferred real estate but retained an interest
the development of death taxes in Europe . . . “); see also Jeffery A. Cooper, Interstate
Competition and State Death Taxes: A Modern Crisis in Historical Perspective, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 835, 836 n.1 (2006) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“The term
‘death tax’ is a generic term that refers to two specific types of taxes imposed upon the
death of an individual, namely ‘estate taxes’ and ‘inheritance taxes,’ the latter also often
being referred to as ‘succession taxes.’”).
12 Revenue Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119 § 111-12, 12 Stat. 432, 485 (1862).
13 Id. at 486. A simple citation fails to capture the breathtaking sweep of this act and
the dire fiscal straits that the Government must have been in to enact it. Along with the
death tax duties, this act created the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
within the Treasury Department and imposed fees on licenses for auctioneers, lawyers,
doctors, liquor dealers, pawn shops, bowling alleys and billiard rooms, peddlers, photographers, medicines, jugglers, circuses, playing cards, etcetera. In the face of this barrage
Alexis de Tocqueville can perhaps be forgiven his hyperbolic prediction that the enactment of an inheritance tax would signal an inevitable socio-economic leveling:
When the legislator has once regulated the law of inheritance, he may rest from
his labor. The machine once put in motion will go on for ages, and advance, as if
self-guided, towards a point indicated beforehand. . . . it divides, distributes,
and disperses both property and power. Alarmed by the rapidity of its progress,
those who despair of arresting its motion endeavor at least to obstruct it by
difficulties and impediments. They vainly seek to counteract its effect by contrary efforts; but it shatters and reduces to powder every obstacle, until we can
no longer see anything but a moving and impalpable cloud of dust, which signals
the coming of the Democracy.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 48 (Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A.
Knopf 1945) (1835).
14 Revenue Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173 §§ 124-150, 13 Stat. 223, 287 (1864).
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measured by the term of her life or for a period ascertainable only by
reference to her death, a tax was payable at the death of the grantor.15
In 1870, after the end of the Civil War, Congress repealed these
taxes.16 Before repeal, the constitutionality of the land succession tax
was challenged by a Mr. Scholey.17 His late wife had left him an interest
in real estate worth $45,000. Remember – there was no exemption for
land passing to widowers. Mr. Scholey claimed18 that the tax was a direct tax that had not been properly apportioned among the states based
on relative population as required by the Constitution.19 The tax survived the attack with the Supreme Court deciding that an inheritance
tax is an excise tax rather than a direct tax.20
Between repeal and Congress’s next experiment with wealth transfer taxes, the political and economic landscape changed. Global trade
and the Industrial Revolution, which had been essential in providing the
strategic assets that the Union used to defeat the Confederacy, had also
facilitated the growth of unprecedented individual wealth.21
French Revolution refugee E.I. DuPont,22 whose family business
made and sold gunpowder to the North, amassed a substantial fortune.
15 Id. at 288. Further changes were made to the tax in 1865 and 1866. In 1865 a
retroactive exemption for real estate passing to a widow (but not to a widower) was
passed and in 1866 a minor child’s share was exempted so long as it did not exceed a
value of $1,000. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 78 § 1, 13 Stat. 469 (1865); Act of July 13, 1866,
ch. 184 § 9, 14 Stat. 98, 140 (1984); see STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS, 2950, 75-90 (2002).
16 Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 255 § 3, 16 Stat. 256, 257 (1870) (repealing the legacy and
stamp taxes); Act of June 6, 1872, ch. 315 § 3617, 17 Stat. 256, 256 (1872) (repealing the
stamp duty).
17 See generally Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. 331, 338 (1874).
18 Id.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
20 Scholey, 90 U.S. at 346. This fact has greater significance in the larger picture
because it meant that death taxes were a Constitutional way for later Congresses to raise
revenue. In contrast, income taxes were held unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmer’s
Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 589 (1895), and would eventually require a Constitutional Amendment (the 16th) to be validly enacted. See infra note 36.
21 See David Frederick, Historical Lessons from the Life and Death of the Federal
Estate Tax, 49 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 201 (2007); see also WEISMAN, supra note 15, at
77.
22 See DU PONT, History, http://www.dupont.com/corporate-functions/our-company/
dupont-history.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). Éleuthère Irénée du Pont de Nemours, a
Parisian chemist, was born in 1771. In 1794, his chemistry mentor, Antoine-Laurent de
Lavoisier, was beheaded during the Reign of Terror. In 1797, his father’s newspaper was
ransacked, and he and his father were imprisoned. He immigrated to the U.S. on January
1, 1800, and founded his chemical company on April 21, 1801 with $36,000 and his belief
that he could make better gunpowder than what was available locally. He had eight
children. Two of his sons and a son-in-law were involved in managing the family business
and helping it become the major supplier of this superior gunpowder to the Union, in-
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Other entrepreneurs followed.23 The Populist movement’s objections to
the increasing growth and concentration of personal wealth in the
United States gave politicians a reason to consider the imposition of
some form of death tax.24
Andrew Carnegie, wielding one of the great fortunes of the Gilded
Age, joined the debate. In his 1889 book, The Gospel of Wealth, he
worried that a man who left his fortune to his children would be disparaged by the populace of the future, who would piously condemn him
(“the public verdict will then be”) by saying, “‘[t]he man who dies thus
rich dies disgraced.’”25 He argued that those with superior abilities and
fortunes should use their time and wealth to establish and administer
philanthropic institutions during their lifetimes.26 He further wrote that
those who died rich should be subject to an inheritance tax of at least

strumental in winning the Civil War. Today, E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, has
58,000 employees and a market capitalization of $68.3 Billion. It is a bellwether publicly
traded company, a component of the Dow Jones Industrial Average that paid $547 million in income taxes with an additional $768 million in deferred income taxes for 2014.
23 “The years immediately following the repeal of the inheritance tax were witness
to an unprecedented number of mergers in the manufacturing sector of the economy,
fueled by the development of a new form of corporate ownership, the holding company.
This resulted in the concentration of wealth in a relatively small number of powerful
companies and in the hands of the businessmen who headed them. Along with such
wealth came great political power, fueling fears over the rise of an American plutocracy
and sparking the growth of the progressive movement. Progressives, including President
Theodore Roosevelt, advocated both an inheritance tax and a graduated income tax as
tools to address inequalities in wealth.” See Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry
W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting, 27 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 118,
120 (2007) (describing the rise of substantial wealth in a small number of powerful companies and business men).
24 Id.
25 See ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH (1889) (published originally
in the North American Review in June 1889, reproduced at https://www.swarthmore.edu/
SocSci/rbannis1/AIH19th/Carnegie.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2015)). In the same essay
he wrote: “the man who dies leaving behind many millions of available wealth, which was
his to administer during life, will pass away ‘unwept, unhonored, and unsung,’ no matter
to what uses he leaves the dross which he cannot take with him.” Id.
26 See id. Carnegie wrote of death taxes: “The growing disposition to tax more and
more heavily large estates left at death is a cheering indication of the growth of a salutary
change in public opinion . . . of all forms of taxation, this seems the wisest. Men who
continue hoarding great sums all their lives, the proper use of which for - public ends
would work good to the community, should be made to feel that the community, in the
form of the state, cannot thus be deprived of its proper share. By taxing estates heavily at
death the state marks its condemnation of the selfish millionaire’s unworthy life.” Id.
Carnegie believed that the wealthy should establish and administer philanthropic institutions during their lifetimes because their entrepreneurial success made it likely that their
philanthropic endeavors would be similarly successful. See id.
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50%.27 Carnegie practiced what he very publicly preached and donated
the bulk of his fortune to charities named after himself, including Carnegie Hall, Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, and the Carnegie Mellon
Institute.28 He left his widow and daughter so little that they had insufficient funds to pay for the upkeep of the family home in Manhattan and
were eventually forced to sell it.29
On April 25, 1898, Congress declared war with Spain. The war was
a short one, but the need for revenue to support the war effort resulted
in our third wealth transmission tax, enacted on June 13, 1898.30 The tax
was imposed on the personal property of estates worth more than
$10,000. The rates applicable to taxable estates ranged between .74%
and 15%, varying according to the kinship degree of the legatees and
the size of the estate. No taxes were imposed on the portion of an estate
passing to a surviving spouse. The war ended on December 10, 1898
and the tax was repealed on April 12, 1902.31
27 See generally id. (“[I]t is difficult to set bounds to the share of a rich man’s estate
which should go at his death to the public through the agency of the state, and by all
means such taxes should be graduated, beginning at nothing upon moderate sums to
dependents, and increasing rapidly as the amounts swell, until of the millionaire’s hoard,
as of Shylock’s, at least ‘The other half comes to the privy coffer of the state.’”)
28 See Columbia Univ. Libraries, Rare Book & Manuscript Library: Philanthropy of
Andrew Carnegie, http://library.columbia.edu/locations/rbml/units/carnegie/andrew.html
(last visited Nov. 16, 2015). Other equally eponymous charities receiving shares of Carnegie’s wealth included: The Andrew Carnegie Birthplace Museum, maintained by the
Carnegie Dunfermline Trust, the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the
Carnegie Foundation, the Carnegie Institute of Technology, the Carnegie Hero Fund
Trust, the Carnegie Institute of Washington, the Carnegie United Kingdom Trust, the
Carnegie Institute (now the Carnegie Library of Pittsburgh and the Carnegie Museums
of Pittsburgh), which originally comprised the Carnegie Library, the Carnegie Museum of
Art, the Carnegie Museum of Natural History and the Carnegie Music Hall. He also
donated money to build many imposing library buildings that prominently bore his name.
It seems Mr. Carnegie was familiar with William Shakespeare’s, The Merchant of Venice
(see supra note 27), and Sir Walter Scott’s The Lay of the Last Minstrel (see supra note
25), but perhaps not Percy Bysshe Shelley’s Ozymandias.
29 See Chloe Sorvino, The Gilded Age Family That Gave It All Away: The Carnegies,
FORBES (July 8, 2014, 9:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chloesorvino/2014/07/08/
whats-become-of-them-the-carnegie-family/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). Ms. Sorvino reports that Thomas Carnegie, Andrew’s younger brother, who also made a fortune during
the Industrial Revolution, did not subscribe to Andrew’s draconian theories of wealth
redistribution. He left his wife and nine children trusts of $10 million each: “that wealth
has now also dried up.” Now, according to a member of the fifth generation of descendants “The money isn’t there.” Id.
30 See War Revenue Act of 1898, ch. 448 §§ 29-30, 30 Stat. 448, 464-466 (amended
1901).
31 Act of April 12, 1902, ch. 500 §§ 7, 11, 32 Stat. 96 (1902).

8

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:1

Again, the constitutionality of the tax was challenged. There were
three grounds of attack: first, that it was an unapportioned, direct tax;
second that it unconstitutionally interfered with rights created solely by
state law; and finally that the taxes were not uniform throughout the
United States, as required by the Constitution,32 because of the variation in tax rates. The Supreme Court rejected the first argument based
on its earlier Scholey decision.33 It rejected the second argument because, in its view, the tax was not imposed on the right of the states to
regulate inheritances but on the transmission or receipt of property at
death.34 Finally, it concluded that the Constitution’s uniformity requirement was met because the tax operated uniformly on a geographical
basis.35 With this decision the constitutionality of our future legislation
taxing inheritances and estates seemed solidly based although — as we
will see — there was one more challenge to come.36
Although the first three wealth transfer taxes seemed to have been
solely motivated by a need to raise revenue, the inclusion of an estate
tax in the War Revenue Act of 1898 was facilitated at least in part by the
growing resentment over dynastic family wealth emerging from industrial capitalism and global trade. The level of concern grew in the years
leading up to World War I, with President Theodore (“Teddy”)
Roosevelt, although himself a member of the privileged class, joining
the pro-death tax movement with a 1906 speech advocating “the adoption of . . . a progressive tax on all fortunes, . . . so framed as to put it out
of the power of the owner of one of these enormous fortunes to hand on
more than a certain amount to any one individual.”37
Teddy’s focus was on the wealth received by each individual, not on
the total amount left by a decedent. His proposed tax was an “inheritance” tax, not an “estate” tax.38 As the father of six children, he was
32

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 81-82, 89 (1900) (citing Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S.
331 (1874)).
34 Id. at 59-60.
35 Id. at 105-06.
36 See id. at 109-10. Following Pollack v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429
(1895), the Supreme Court struck down a federal income tax that treated inheritances
and gifts as income, see Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 227 n.22. (“this definition was buried
in the general debris.”), not because it believed that Congress lacked the authority to tax
inheritances and gifts as income, but because it concluded that the tax on income generated by real or personal property, that was an integral part of the tax, was a direct, unapportioned tax.
37 Theodore Roosevelt, Address of President Roosevelt at the Laying of the Corner
Stone of the Office Building of the House of Representatives: The Man With The Muck
Rake (Apr. 15, 1906), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/tr-muckrake/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
38 Both of which would be “death taxes.” See supra note 11.
33
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likely personally aware that it takes a much larger after-tax estate to
provide for each of six children, than it does to provide for a single child.
Six years later the Progressive Party included an inheritance tax in its
platform, not so much as a means of breaking up inherited wealth but as
a “means of equalizing the obligations of holders of property to government.”39 Teddy and the Progressive Party were unsuccessful. The enactment of the next wealth transmission tax, the one we have had now
for almost 100 years, awaited the next critical need for revenues. It took
a horrific war in Europe and a recognition that the United States
needed to prepare for involvement.40 Once the need for additional revenue was accepted, a wealth transmission tax again became a political
possibility. This time Congress chose an estate tax rather than an inheritance tax.
Jens Beckert, a German economic sociologist, studied the Congressional debates that preceded the adoption of the estate tax as part of the
Revenue Act of 1916, as well as a number of other debates involving the
estate tax. These studies are published in chart form in his 2004 book
Inherited Wealth.41 They provide interesting insight into the reasons
why the relevant Senators and Representatives voted for and against the
estate tax.
The 1916 Congressional debates show that 59% of the supporters of
the tax did so because of the need for revenue combined with a belief
that using an estate tax to raise needed revenue was a fair way to do it.42
Only 22.6% of them based their support on goals relating to the rejection of privileges attributable to inherited wealth and the promotion of
greater wealth equality.43 The principal objections of the opponents included the still-familiar argument against double taxation and one we
don’t hear much anymore – that wealth transmission taxes be left to the
states. Seventy-five percent of the opponents based their opposition on
the states’ rights principle.44 At the time of the debate 42 states had
already adopted their own version of a wealth transmission tax.45
39 Declaration of the Progressive Party Platform (Aug. 7, 1912), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/americanexperience/features/primary-resources/tr-progressive/ (last visited Nov.
16, 2015).
40 H.R REP NO. 922, at 1 (1916) (“The necessity for this legislation grows out of the
extraordinary appropriations for the Army and Navy and the fortification of our
country.”).
41 JENS BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH (Thomas Dunlap trans., Princeton Univ.
Press 2008) (2004).
42 Id. at 183.
43 Id. at 184.
44 Id. at 183.
45 Joseph J. Thorndike, A Century of Soaking the Rich: The Origins of the Federal
Estate Tax, TAX ANALYST, July 10, 2006, at 295, http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/read-
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The 1916 Revenue Act exempted the first $50,000 from tax (about
$1 million in today’s dollars)46 and imposed rates between 2% and 10%
on estates worth more than $5,000,000 (about $100 million in today’s
dollars). There was no exemption for property passing to spouses but
many of the other features of the tax were the same as they are today.
The tax base included not only property owned by the decedent at death
but also property transferred in contemplation of death or intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment after death, and jointly held
property, to the extent the decedent furnished the consideration.47
As our entry into World War I grew closer, the need for additional
revenue became more imperative. Congress increased the estate tax’s
contribution to the war effort by increasing its rate two times with the
top rate eventually increased to 25%.48 With a top rate of only 25%, the
wealth leveling potential of the estate tax was not particularly strong,
confirming Beckert’s conclusion that the real objective of those who enacted the estate tax in 1916 was to collect revenue to meet a critical need
in a fair and equitable way rather than confiscating and redistributing
wealth.49 In 1917, estate tax returns were required to be filed by less
than 1% of the decedents.50 As the value of the exemption eroded with
inflation, that percentage increased to as much as 1.3% in 1922.51 As
has almost always been the case, the tax was also not particularly effecings.nsf/ArtWeb/880F5B5E62FE817F852571B0006851CA?OpenDocument (last visited
Nov. 16, 2015).
46 The appropriate method to calculate this inflation adjustment is controversial. Id.
(“Estimates range from roughly $900,000 to more than $11 million, depending on the
method and political agenda at work. Calculations based on the commodity price index –
popular among estate tax supporters – yield the lower number; calculations based on
gross domestic product – popular among opponents – yield the higher estimate”). Id.
47 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, § 202, 38 Stat. 756, 777-778 (1916).
48 See Revenue Act of March 3, 1917, Pub. L. No. 377, § 300, 36 Stat. 1000, 1002
(1917); War Revenue Act of October 3, 1917, Pub. L. No. 50, § 900, 39 Stat. 300, 324
(1917); Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, § 400, 39 Stat. 1057, 1096 (1918); Revenue
Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, § 400, 40 Stat. 227, 277 (1921).
49 Contra James R. Repetti, Democracy Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825,
825 (2001) (“Congress adopted an estate tax in 1916 in response to concerns about the
harmful social effects of wealth concentration.”); Id. at 831 (“For its first 150 years, however, the United States federal government only used an inheritance tax to raise revenue
during times of war. It was not until President Theodore Roosevelt proposed adopting a
heavily progressive income tax in 1906 that national focus shifted to using the tax to
prevent concentrations of wealth as well as to raise revenues. He proposed a tax to prevent ‘the owner of . . . enormous fortunes to hand more than [a] certain amount. . .’ The
estate tax was not actually adopted until 1916. At that time, the economist Irving Fisher
urged an estate tax to address the ‘danger of an hereditary plutocracy’ to ‘democratic
ideals’.” (citations omitted)).
50 Kathy Medve, Estate Tax Returns Revisited, 1916-1931, 60 fig.A, http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-soi/16-31estxrtre.pdf.
51 Id.
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tive in collecting revenue. In 1917, estate tax collections amounted to
only .55% of total revenues.52 This rose as high as 3.49% in 1922.53
In 1918 the Senate tried to replace the estate tax with an inheritance tax. The compromise act in 1919 retained the estate tax with
lower rates, an expansion of the base to include the value of a surviving
spouse’s rights of dower and curtesy, life insurance proceeds in excess of
$40,000 received by an executor and certain property passing by exercise
of a general power of appointment, and a new deduction for charitable
contributions.54
How could there have been another constitutional attack after the
Supreme Court’s 1900 decision in Knowlton? Jacob Harsen Purdy died
a resident of New York City in December of 1916, shortly after the enactment of the 1916 estate tax. His executor, the New York Trust Company, now JP Morgan Chase, paid state inheritance taxes of $37,799 and
federal estate taxes of $23,911 and sued for a refund.55 It could no
longer challenge the constitutionality of an inheritance tax after Knowlton. But the bank claimed that the new federal estate tax was different
from an inheritance tax, saying: “[T]he United States has [the] power to
tax legacies, . . . but this tax is cast upon a transfer while it is being
effectuated by the state itself, and therefore is an intrusion upon its
processes, whereas a legacy tax is not imposed until the process is complete.”56 Again, a states’ right argument was presented.
Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes dispensed with this argument
concluding that “if a tax on the property distributed by the laws of a
state determined by the fact that distribution has been accomplished, is
valid, a tax determined by the fact that distribution is about to begin is
no greater interference and is equally good.”57
The bank also claimed that an inheritance tax was not a direct tax
because the tax is on the privilege of receiving, which may be avoided,
while an estate tax is inevitable and therefore direct.58 Here’s the
source of one of Holmes’s familiar quotations. Holmes said that the
Court’s decision in Knowlton did not attempt to make a scientific distinction between a tax on the privilege of receiving wealth and on the
privilege of transmitting it but instead based its decision on “an interpre52 David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Description, Profile of Taxpayers, and Economic Consequences, 62 tbl.16 (U.S. Dep’t. of Treas., Working Paper No. 80,
1998), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/ota80
.pdf.
53 Id.
54 Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, § 400, 40 Stat. 1057, 1097-98, 1121 (1919).
55 N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 346 (1921).
56 Id. at 348.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 349.
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tation of language by its traditional use — on the practical and historical
ground that this kind of tax always has been regarded as the antithesis of
a direct tax; ‘has ever been treated as a duty or excise, because of the
particular occasion which gives rise to its levy.’”59 And he concluded by
saying, “Upon this point a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”60
Andrew Mellon, the Secretary of the Treasury, organized a spirited
attack against the estate tax in the 1920s.61 Despite his efforts, Congress
increased the maximum rate in 1924, from 25% to 40%, introduced the
gift tax, and provided a credit for state death taxes paid, in amounts up
to 25% of the federal estate tax.62 Mellon attempted to use some of the
same campaign techniques that have recently been used against the
wealth transfer tax system. He engaged a lobbyist to try to raise grassroots support and used arguments that are similar to the ones modern
transfer tax opponents are using. His testimony before the Senate Finance Committee described his belief that the estate tax undermined
the nation’s economy. He claimed that “forced sales of securities for
payment of estate and inheritance taxes permanently depleted capital
not only because the government claimed a portion, but also because
the value of the capital in the purchaser’s hands was determined by his
purchase price at depressed rates.”63 He predicted that eventually the
capital of the country would be worthless and disappear altogether.64
Unlike today’s opponents, he failed to generate any significant pro-repeal press.
Mellon achieved a reduction in the top estate tax rate to 20%, a
repeal of the gift tax and a return of most of the estate tax revenue to
the states by raising the credit for state estate taxes to 80% of the federal tax (a maximum of 16% when the top rate is 20%).65 But his goal
of repeal failed. The estate tax remained alive, ready to be rejuvenated
when the nation’s fiscal policies put it in the position of needing additional revenue.
59

Id. (quoting Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 81-83 (1900)).
Id.
61 M. Susan Murnane, Andrew Mellon’s Unsuccessful Attempt to Repeal Estate
Taxes, TAX ANALYST, Aug. 22, 2005, http://www.taxhistory.org/thp/readings.nsf/cf7c9c87
0b600b9585256df80075b9dd/672746f8e859ea77852570900006ac21?OpenDocument (last
visited Nov. 16, 2015).
62 Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 300, 43 Stat. 254, 303-04, 313 (1925)
(Estate Tax § 301(a), p. 303; credit for State taxes § 301(b), p. 304; Gift Tax § 319, p. 313);
Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 232 n.51 (The rate increase and gift tax were retroactively
repealed, Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-20, § 322, 44 Stat. 9 (1926)).
63 Murnane, supra note 61.
64 Id. at n.34.
65 Id.
60
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Yet Beckert’s charts show that Congress, on balance, was still not
supportive of the estate tax as a means of redressing wealth inequality.
Only 14.4% of the supporters based their support on goals relating to
the rejection of privileges attributable to inherited wealth and the promotion of greater wealth equality, down from 22.6% in 1916.66 The
principal basis for support continued to be the view that the tax provided an equitable means of raising revenue.
In 1932, as the Depression deepened, Congress raised rates at most
levels of taxable estates, raised the top rates from 20% to 45%, cut the
exemption in half to $50,000, and resurrected the gift tax with rates set
at 3/4 of the estate tax rates calculated on a tax exclusive basis.67 The
stated purpose of the gift tax was to prevent the avoidance of the estate
tax through lifetime gifts.68 But it is likely that an important additional
motive was the raising of immediate revenue. The purpose of preventing estate tax avoidance could have been equally well served by a gift
tax that raised the same revenue per dollar of gift as would be raised by
the estate tax. Instead, the net effect of the lower rate and tax-exclusive
nature of the gift tax produced an effective rate of 25.23%. Supporters
of the lower level of gift tax pointed out in the debates that the reduced
tax would encourage lifetime giving and “increase the income to the
Treasury when it is most needed.”69
Before we see what happened next, let’s look at Mr. Bromley’s constitutional attack on the gift tax. Joseph Bromley made a gift, paid a gift
tax and filed a claim for refund attacking the gift tax as a direct tax,
unconstitutionally unapportioned among the states, and unconstitutionally lacking in uniformity, two of the arguments that were earlier used
66

BECKERT, supra note 41, at 191.
The gift tax law contained a lifetime exemption of $50,000 and a yearly exemption
of $5,000. Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 234; Murnane, supra note 61, at 81 (“Mellon made
no further attempt to secure estate tax repeal before the Great Depression mooted the
issue.”); Murnane, supra note 61, at 82 (“Mellon might have succeeded in repealing the
estate tax if only tax receipts had been higher in 1928 or the stock market had not crashed
in 1929”).
68 REPORT ON REVENUE ACT OF 1932, H.R. Rep. No. 72-708, at 8 (1932) (gift tax
will “assist in the collection of the income and estate taxes, and prevent their avoidance
through the splitting up of estates during the lifetime of a taxpayer . . . .”); S. COMM. ON
FINANCE, REPORT ON REVENUE BILL OF 1932, S. REP. NO. 72-665, at 11 (1932) (“As a
protection to both estate and income taxes, a gift tax is imposed.”); see Jeffrey A. Cooper,
Ghosts of 1932; The Lost History of Estate and Gift Taxation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 875, 911
n.153, 910-911 (2010).
69 75 CONG. REC. 6, 5903 (1932) (statement of Rep. Canfield). Eisenstein’s interpretation of the motivation for the estate tax confirms Beckert’s conclusion. See Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 234. (“When the estate tax was finally revived at the end of this
dismal period [the Mellon era], the controlling motivation was a desire to obtain revenue
and not a desire to break down estates. Among those who made tax policy the levy was
still a fiscal measure.”)
67
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against the estate tax.70 The uniformity argument was rejected in the
same manner as it was rejected in the estate tax case. The uniformity
requirement requires geographical not intrinsic uniformity.71 The direct
tax analysis is more interesting. The Supreme Court told us in the 1929
Bromley decision that a tax on a gift is not a direct tax because it is a tax
imposed on the exercise of one of the rights incident to the ownership of
property, not on the property itself.72 Those of you who are interested
in the generation-skipping transfer tax might ask yourself who is exercising what right when a taxable termination occurs. The answer could be
that the generation-skipping transfer tax on a taxable transfer is simply
an additional tax imposed on a transferor’s transfer to a trust that has
generation-skipping transfer potential deferred until the taxable transfer
takes place.
The next big debates over the wealth transfer tax occurred in the
mid-30s. Franklin Delano Roosevelt (“FDR”) became President of the
United States in 1933. He faced a continuing economic crisis as well as a
growing populist movement spearheaded by Louisiana Democrat Huey
Long, who called for a radical redistribution of wealth. The goal of his
Share Our Wealth Society was to confiscate fortunes over $8 million,
limit annual income to $1 million, limit inheritances to $5 million and
use the funds to provide every American family with an annual income
of $2,000 and every American with a free university education.73 By
1935 the Share Our Wealth societies had more than 7.5 million members
in 27,000 clubs.74 One of FDR’s ways of dealing with both crises was to
suggest a new succession and inheritance tax to go hand in hand with the
current estate tax. It would be imposed on any individual who received
large amounts of gifts or inheritances. His thinking was that a more
radical redistribution of wealth through the estate tax would put more
purchasing power in the hands of poorer people whose additional anticipated spending, it was hoped, would bolster the economy. In addition,
it would undercut Huey Long’s support.
FDR failed in his attempt to enact an additional succession tax, but
he did persuade Congress to raise the top estate tax bracket to 70% and
to decrease the exemption to $40,000, about $800,000 in today’s dol-

70

Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 134-35 (1929).
Id. at 138.
72 Id.
73 Share Our Wealth (a.k.a. Share the Wealth), HUEY LONG, http://www.hueylong
.com/programs/share-our-wealth.php (last visited Nov, 16, 2015).
74 Id.
71
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lars.75 The 1935 Act also introduced the alternate valuation date.76 In
the year after the 1935 Act, the new law resulted in an increase in the
share of total revenues contributed by the transfer tax system from
5.89% to 9.71% although it still affected less than 1% of decedents.
This time Beckert’s charts show some increased support for the use of
the wealth transfer tax system to redistribute wealth and eliminate the
privileges of inherited wealth.77 Of those who supported an increase in
estate taxes, 33.9% of them argued for increases on this basis, up from
only 14.4% in 1926.78
In 1940 Congress imposed a temporary 10% tax increase to raise
funds for defense.79 This increased the top estate tax rate to 77%, an
increase that became permanent in 1941.80 The top rate then remained
at 77% for 25 years until 1976.81 The Revenue Act of 1942 also increased the estate tax exemption to $60,000, pegged the gift tax exemption at $30,000, and created the $3,000 per donee annual gift tax
exclusion.
One more important revision to the system was made before the
1976 revisions, the first big set of changes that many of us were around
to watch happen. That change was the passage of the 50% estate tax
and gift tax marital deductions.82 For many married individuals in noncommunity property states, this change had the effect of reducing the
progressivity of the tax. By dividing the estate between two spouses,
each would get two rides up the progressive brackets.
In spite of our victory in World War II and the global economic
supremacy victory gave us, not much happened to the provisions of the
estate and gift tax between 1948 and 1976. They were years of relative
stability.
During those post-war Baby Boom years, the debate continued between proponents of a wealth transfer tax that would redistribute tax75

Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-49, § 201, 49 Stat. 1014, 1021 (1935).
Revenue Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-62, § 202(a), 49 Stat. 1014, 1021 -1022 (1935)
(The alternate valuation date was one year after death); see also Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 23, at 122.
77 BECKERT, supra note 41, at 191.
78 See Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 235 (“The levelling of hereditary fortunes was
formally approved as one of its objectives.. . . In 1935 the accent on levelling became
bolder.”); see Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 237 (“At best, then, the social objective of the
estate tax was prominent only in 1934 and 1935. Yet even in those years the deliberate
destruction of ‘great accumulations of wealth’ was more verbal than actual.”).
79 Revenue Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-54, § 201, 54 Stat. 516, 520 (1940).
80 Revenue Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-55, § 401, 55 Stat. 692, 705 (1941); See Eisenstein, supra note 3, at n.83.
81 Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 23, at 122.
82 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, §§ 361, 62 Stat. 110, 116 (1948) (Estate
Tax); Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, § 372, 62 Stat. 110, 125 (1948) (Gift Tax).
76
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payer assets and the opponents who sought to protect private wealth
from government interference. The proponents talked about equal opportunities and the opponents about the adverse economic consequences of a strengthened wealth transfer tax system. The proponents
gradually lost ground against positions based on supply-oriented economics.83 The economy was in pretty good shape. There was no longer
much reason to blame wealthy individuals or their families for the economic problems of the nation. In fact, because economic prosperity was
accompanied by an increase of individually controlled wealth, some
were convinced that redistributing that wealth might interfere with continued prosperity.84
One of the last political efforts to turn the estate tax into a significant wealth redistribution tool was launched in 1972 by the Democrat
presidential candidate, George McGovern. Emulating Huey Long’s
earlier efforts, McGovern campaigned for an inheritance tax that would
collect 100% of the wealth of each decedent after the first $500,000
(about $2.8 million in 2015 dollars).85 Collections would be used to provide each family with a minimum income of $4,000. McGovern’s plan
was poorly thought out and was widely rejected. McGovern’s spokesperson (Richard Dougherty) explained the rejection of this inheritance
proposal by what he called the “dream factor.”86 “Every . . . [ordinary
person] in the street thinks that if he hits the lottery big, he may be able
to leave half a million to his family.”87 Given that 50-60% of adults
living in states where there is a legal lottery play and of those, two-thirds
play regularly,88 the dream factor or as John Oliver wryly dubbed it in

83

See BECKERT, supra note 41, at 196.
See id. at 197; Eisenstein, supra note 3, at 238 (“Neither the 1934 Act nor the 1935
Act disturbs my conclusion that the estate tax has been primarily imposed for revenue. I
am not unaware that the tax has also helped to redistribute wealth. But any progressive
levy on income or wealth will have this effect. Nor do I forget the desire to control
accumulations significantly contributed to the development of the tax. Undoubtedly that
objective infiltrated into its rate structure. Still the fact remains that the growth of the tax
responded more to the stimulus of revenue that to eloquent exhortations for the dismantling of estates.”).
85 BECKERT, supra note 41, at 196.
86 See Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 119 (1990).
87 McGovern: “Jobs are the Cornerstone of My Policy”, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1972,
at A12.
88 Roger Dunstan, Gambling in California, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, https://www
.library.ca.gov/CRB/97/03/Chapt3.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). (“A large proportion,
about 50 to 60 percent of adult Americans play legal lotteries in lottery states. Two-thirds
of these play regularly, which means that about one-third of the adults are regular
players.”).
84
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his recent segment on the death tax, “the optimism of the American
public,”89 may actually be the right explanation.90
In any event, during this period of legislative inactivity, changes in
the economy were working to expand the reach of the transfer tax system. Increasing numbers of donors and decedents were drawn into its
grasp by inflationary forces. In 1948 estate and gift tax revenues made
up 2.14% of total revenues and about 2% of all decedents were required
to file returns.91 By 1976, the revenue share contributed by the transfer
tax was about the same as it had been in 1948, but the filing requirements now reached 13% of all decedents.92 Not only were more fami89 Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Wealth Gap (HBO television broadcast July
13, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v LF gSEwjAeno (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
See also Ascher, supra note 86, at 119 (“Americans seem attached not only to buying
tickets in state lotteries and watching television game shows, but also to dreaming about
‘rich uncles’ whose imminent death will make them instant millionaires.”); Lee Anne
Fennell, Death, Taxes, and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 603 (2003) (“Optimism might
well interact with some of the strictly rational reasons for opposing the estate tax to
expand the number of estate tax opponents significantly.”); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise
the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 285 (1983) (“The only convincing explanation that has occurred to me for this phenomenon lies in the optimism of the American
people.”); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861,
1944-45 (1994) (“Why do people oppose a very limited, nominally progressive tax, one
that has the further advantage of speaking directly to liberal egalitarian notions of equal
opportunity and level playing fields? One answer . . . is a ‘lottery mentality’ . . . or . . .
might there be a moral dimension to the factually erroneous identification of most people
with estate tax targets?”); see generally Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play Lotteries
and Why It Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 71, 82 (1994) (exploring high rates of lottery
participation despite standard economic theories that would suppose that normal risk
aversion would make people unlikely to participate in typical lottery play).
90 Fennell, supra note 89, at 593-615 (exploring some reasons which include uncertainty about social mobility, “rational ignorance,” framing distortions, and mental accounting errors); ROBERT NOZICK, EXAMINED LIFE 30 (1989) (describing sociological
explanations for the widespread opposition to inheritance taxes by indicating that bequests to family members are important in our society as an expression of caring about
them, as a means of intensifying family bonds and as creating an extended identity between the giver and the receiver); GEORG F. W. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY
OF RIGHT, § 214 (A. W. Wood ed., 1821) (explaining that assets owned at the death of an
individual are the common resources of the family). See generally BECKERT, supra note
41, at 196 (discussing broadly the debates over rights of inheritance and rights to curtail
inheritance through taxation).
91 Joulfaian, supra note 52, at 62 tbl. 16 (illustrating the percent of total Estate and
Gift Tax receipts in 1948 as 2.14%); Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 23, at 125
(illustrating in figure F that taxable estate tax returns were 2% in 1948 and in figure G
the estate and gift receipts as a percentage of total revenue in 1976 was about the same as
it had been in 1948).
92 Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 23, at 125; Edward J. McCaffery, Grave
Robbers: The Moral Case against the Death Tax, 353 CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS at 4
(1999); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, Composition of “Other Receipts”: 1940–2020, Table 2.5 (1999) (select desired table at https://www.whitehouse.gov/
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lies caught by the tax but some taxpayers, like farmers, realized that
their land was located in areas ripe for residential and commercial development and that the value of their land for estate tax purposes would
be the development value rather than the farm value. This meant that
their farms would be subject to the tax, and, unless they generated and
put aside sufficient cash before they died, the farm or maybe some other
treasured appreciated family heirloom or assets would have to be sold.
Think of a potato farmer on Long Island. He and his family have
earned a modest living farming potatoes for several generations. For
agricultural purposes, his land has a value of $30,000. However, a commercial developer is willing to buy the farm for $100,000. If the farmer
dies when the estate tax exemption is only $60,000, as it was before the
Tax Reform Act of 1976, the farm would have to be sold to pay the
estate tax because his estate will be valued at $100,000. And this problem was likely to get worse each successive generation. Some of you
may remember these arguments from 1976.
The farmers brought their concern to Congress.93 The result was
the conversion of the exemption to a credit, which had the effect of
excluding the first $120,000 of date-of-death value from the tax, an exclusion that was to be raised over a number of years until it reached
$175,625 in 1981. The farmers were also able to win a decrease in the
top rate from 77% to 70%, an increased marital deduction and section
2032A’s94 set of special valuation rules applicable to farms and small
businesses. As part of the package, the estate and gift tax systems were
substantially integrated and a new generation-skipping transfer tax and
the short-lived carry-over basis regime were created.95
Beckert’s charts show just how badly the support for wealth redistribution had eroded between 1935 and 1976.96 Of course, total repeal
was not on the table yet. But now only 17.7% of those who argued
against the reduction in the estate tax’s reach used redistributive arguments.97 Most of their arguments were based on concerns over lost revomb/budget/Historicals (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (discussing the gift and estate tax as a
percentage of “other receipts” comprising federal revenue by fiscal year).
93 See Stanley S. Surrey, Reflections on the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 25 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 303, 319-22 (discussing Congress’s role in the matter); Daniel J. Balz, Congress
Looks at Death and Taxes But Outlook Is Far From Certain, NAT’L J., Mar. 13, 1976 at
328.
94 Unless indicated to the contrary, references to “section” are to sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”).
95 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001-06, 90 Stat. 1520, 1846-79
(1976); See Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401, 94 Stat.
229, 299-301 (1980) (repealing the carryover basis created by the Tax Reform Act of
1976).
96 BECKERT, supra note 41, at 193.
97 Id. at 202, 204.
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enue. In contrast, foreshadowing what was to come in 2001, 55% of the
supporters of the reform were concerned with the effect of the estate tax
on farms and small businesses.98 Furthermore, 17.8% of the supporters
were concerned with “bracket creep,” a problem not limited to farmers
and owners of small businesses, and 8.9% thought it was important to be
able to preserve wealth for family members.99
At about this time Columbia University Law School professor
George Cooper published an article in the Columbia Law Review explaining that the exemption levels and certain sophisticated estate planning techniques that utilized the exemptions made the estate tax a
largely voluntary tax.100 Professor Cooper’s article was one of the opening salvos in an academic counter-offensive launched by some professors against the anti-estate tax lobbies of the farm and small business
groups. Although he was supportive of the goals of the wealth transfer
tax system he expressed the view that “[u]nless the system can be significantly reformed, consideration should be given to scrapping it or at least
replacing it with a more effective means of accomplishing its perceived
goals.”101
Between the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and EGTRRA’s temporary
repeal, Congress whittled away at the impact of the estate tax. In 1981,
the top rate was lowered from 70% to 50%, the 50% marital deduction
became the 100% marital deduction and the annual gift tax exclusion
became $10,000, up from $3,000.102 In 1986, the 1976 generation-skipping transfer tax was retroactively repealed and replaced with a new tax,
the goals of which were the same, but which also taxed direct gifts to
grandchildren and other members of a transferor’s grandchildren’s generation and more remote generations.103 In 1990, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act gave us Chapter 14 and its special valuation rules.104
The Tax Relief Act of 1997 raised the exemption equivalent to $1 million and indexed the annual gift tax exclusion, the GST exemption and
section 2032A’s special use valuation exemptions for inflation.105
98

Id. at 202, 205-06.
Id. at 202.
100 See George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax: New Perspectives on Sophisticated Tax
Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 169, 221 (1977); see infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
101 Cooper, supra note 100, at 223.
102 Economic Recovery and Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 441, 95 Stat. 314,
319 (1981).
103 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 1432-33, 2515, 100 Stat. 2085,
2729-2732 (1986).
104 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 2701-04, 104
Stat. 1388-491, 1388-491-501 (1990).
105 Tax Payer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 501, 111 Stat. 788, 845-846
(1997).
99
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This brings us to 2001 and the brief repeal of the estate and generation-skipping transfer tax, but not the gift tax. By 2001, bracket creep
had once again brought the wealth transfer tax system to the attention
of a broader group of the public. Between 1989 and 2001, the percentage of decedents whose estates were forced to file estate tax returns
climbed from 2.52% to more than 5%.106 Starting in the 1990s, a movement to repeal the estate tax gathered momentum, and attracted enough
support to pass The Death Tax Elimination Act in 2000, an act that was
later vetoed by President Bill Clinton.107 Support for repeal came from
a wide number of lobbying groups, including, surprisingly to some,108
groups most of whose members were not likely to ever be caught in the
wealth transfer tax system, the National Association of Women Business
Owners, the National Black Chamber of Commerce, and the National
Indian Business Association109 to name a few.
A counter movement eventually came together led by Warren Buffet and George Soros, but they were too late to make much of a difference. They and a number of other wealthy individuals took out ads in
newspapers arguing against repeal on the grounds “that complete repeal
of the estate tax would be bad for our democracy, our economy, and our
society. . . . Repealing the estate tax would enrich the heirs of America’s
millionaires and billionaires while hurting families who struggle to make
ends meet . . . and would have a devastating impact on public
charities.”110
106 See Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 23, at 124-25. See also, Appendix
Table 1 for a chart that shows the percentages of decedents required to file federal estate
tax returns for 1916 through 2011.
107 Death Tax Elimination Act of 2000-Veto Message from the President of the
United States, 146 CONG. REC. H7240, H7240-41 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 2000).
108 Cooper, supra note 11, at 836 n.5 (“Death taxation often provokes disproportionately emotional reactions.”); Graetz, supra note 89, at 259 (“For several decades, total
revenues raised by estate and gift taxes have roughly equalled those raised by excise
taxes on alcohol and tobacco. Yet no law journal has ever asked me to write on alcohol
or tobacco excise taxes . . . . We do not hear of the suffering of widows and orphans (or
even of farmers and small businesses) because of alcohol and tobacco taxes. Philosophers
and economists do not routinely debate the merits of such taxes. Perhaps most significantly, increases in such excise taxes do not arouse fears that we are about to eliminate
the concept of private property in this country and embrace socialism, or even communism. The estate tax, however, evokes just such responses.”); Fennell, supra note 89, at
568-69 (“Two puzzles surround the estate tax. First, why is it so unpopular, even among
those who could not reasonably expect to be subjected to it? . . . I examine ways in which
features of human cognition interact with rational decision-making processes to generate
both excessive hostility towards the tax and surprisingly low levels of liability-reducing
gift giving.”).
109 GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 11, at 72.
110 Press Release, United For a Fair Economy, Bill Gates, Sr., George Soros, Steven
Rockefeller, 100 Others Oppose Estate Tax Repeal (Feb. 14, 2001), http://www.fairecono
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When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, he made repeal a priority and almost achieved his goal. In the end, however, a
failure to obtain support from 60% of the Senators (necessitated by the
Byrd Rule),111 resulted in only a one-year repeal in 2010 of the estate
tax and the generation-skipping transfer tax.112 The repeal was accompanied by a carry-over basis regime that permitted basis adjustments of
$1.3 million and an extra basis adjustment of $3 million for property
passing to a surviving spouse.113
What happened to the gift tax? Although gift tax repeal had been
part of the original proposal, several prominent trusts and estates lawyers alerted Congress to the potential income tax abuses they thought
would occur if the gift tax no longer provided a barrier to making
gifts.114 The predicted abuses included gifts of appreciated assets by tax
payers in high brackets to low tax paying family members. The idea was
that the donees would sell the assets, pay tax at lower rates and then
return the proceeds to the original owner.115 As a result, the gift tax
repeal portion of the proposed legislation was dropped.
In the years between 2001 and 2013, the exemption amount for the
estate tax and the generation-skipping transfer tax was gradually increased from $675,000 to $3,500,000, the credit for state death taxes was
converted to a deduction, and the top tax rate was decreased from 55%
to 45%.116 President Bush signed EGTRRA on June 7, 2001.117
my.org/press_room/2001/gates_sr_soros_100_others_oppose_estate_tax_repeal. (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
111 2 U.S.C. § 644 (2000). The Rule permits Senators to block legislation if it significantly increases the federal deficit beyond a ten-year term; see also STANDING RULES OF
THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 113-18, at 16, r. XXII(2) (2013).
112 See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
§ 501, 115 Stat. 38, 69 (2001).
113 Task Force on Fed. Wealth Transfer Taxes, Report on Reform of Federal Wealth
Transfer Taxes, A.B.A. § 7, at 33 (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/tax/pubpolicy/2004/04fwtt.authcheckdam.pdf.
114 David Cay Johnston, Questions Raised on New Bush Plan To End Estate Tax,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001, at A1.
115 See President’s Tax Relief Proposals: Tax Proposals Affecting Individuals: Hearing Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 87 (2001) [hereinafter President’s
Tax Relief Proposals] (statement of Lauren Y. Detzel, Attorney, Dean Mead Egerton
Bloodworth Capuano & Bozarth, P.A.); see also Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Mitchell M.
Gans, Wealth Transfer Tax Repeal: Some Thoughts on Policy and Planning, 90 TAX
NOTES 393 (2001); Johnston, supra note 114, at A21.
116 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S
FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS at 193-94 (Feb. 2015), http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2016.pdf.
117 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–16,
115 Stat. 38 (2001).
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Beckert’s final chart shows just how much Congress’s attitude toward the wealth transfer tax system had changed since 1935 and even
since 1976.118 Only 2.8% of them cared any longer about wealth distribution and equality issues.119 Their opposition to repeal was based
purely on revenue concerns. Indeed, 78% of the supporters of repeal
wanted to protect small businesses and farms.120
THE PRESENT
The temporary repeal is now behind us. The wealth transfer tax
system has been restored in a much-weakened form. It is now responsible for less than 1% of federal revenues and affects less than 1/2% of
decedents.121
The controversy about the tax continues. President Obama, according to his latest budget proposal,122 wants to restore the tax to its
2009 parameters, which could bring its share of total revenues to about
1% and increase covered decedents to about 1%. But since the exemption level he is suggesting would not be subject to any adjustments for
inflation, inflationary bracket creep would gradually cause many more
decedents’ estates to be caught. His proposal would also tax capital
gains at death and any disposition of appreciated property by gift.123
What’s left of our weakened wealth transfer tax system? We have
an exemption of $5,430,000 per individual, or effectively $10,860,000 for
a married couple.124 At the somewhat lower exemption level for dece118

BECKERT, supra note 41, at 205-06.
Id. at 206.
120 Id.
121 JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, HISTORY, PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM, JCX-52-15, at 1 (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.jct
.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4744 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
122 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 116, at 193.
123 Id. at 155-57. The proposal would increase the top tax rate on long term capital
gains to 28% (with the 3.8% net investment income tax), and incongruously (and without
any explanation) makes portable and expands the $250,000 exclusion on gain from the
sale of a principle residence to all residences, but continues to postpone the taxation of
unrealized gains on transfers to spouses “until the spouse disposes of the asset or dies.”
Id. at 156-57. The elimination of carry-over basis was referred to misleadingly as “closing
the trust fund loophole,” though it has nothing to do with trust funds and does not close a
“loophole,” so much as erases a fundamental provision of the Code. See Julie Hirshfeld
Davis, Obama Will Seek to Reduce Taxes on Middle Class, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2015 at
A1, A22. (stating that “[t]he centerpiece of the plan, described by administration officials
on the condition of anonymity ahead of the president’s speech, would eliminate what Mr.
Obama’s advisers call the ‘trust-fund loophole,’ a provision governing inherited assets
that shields hundreds of billions of dollars from taxation each year.” There is no suggestion by the Times that there is anything disingenuous about the label.)
124 This amount is annually indexed for inflation. The $5,430,000 amount is in effect
for 2015. Rev. Proc. 14-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, 867 § 3.33. The recent wide-spread recog119
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dents who died in 2012 and 2013, only 10,568 decedents were required
to file federal estate tax returns in 2013.125 There are now 7,629 members of the Real Property Probate and Trust Section126 who have indicated they practice in our field, meaning there are fewer than two estate
tax returns to be filed per member.
That may mean there will be less work for us in preparing and defending estate tax returns, but plenty more do in the planning and gift
tax areas. Two professors of economics, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel
Zucman from Berkley and London recently published a study of wealth
distribution in the United States and concluded that in 2012 there were
1,607,000 families with average net wealth of $13,840,000, the top 1%.127
These families continue to need our planning skills. There are more
than 200 of them for each of us. Not all members of the group have
more than $10,860,000 now — the threshold level for inclusion in this
category is $3,960,000 — but many of them have hopes that they will,
and the best time for an individual to plan is before she acquires all of
her wealth. And many of them may share a concern that President
Obama will be successful in rolling back the exemption level to
$3,500,000 and casting the estate tax net over their families.
What planning techniques work in today’s environment? In the 38
years since Professor Cooper wrote about the voluntary tax, much has
been written describing the available planning techniques, in some cases
for the purposes of instructing us how to use them128 and in other cases
to invite Congress to shut them down.129 In 2004, a task force composed
nition of same-sex marriage, United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013),
expands the potential revenue impact of the increased exemption. For a discussion of the
potential impact of the recent same-sex marriage decisions, see Carlyn S. McCaffrey &
John C. McCaffrey: Obergefell and the Authority of the IRS to Challenge Valid Marriages
and Divorces, LISI EST. PLAN. NEWSL. No. 2345 (Sept. 21, 2015).
125 I.R.S., Estate Tax Returns Filed in 2013 [1], by Tax Status and Size of Gross Estate, STAT. OF INCOME DIV. (Oct. 2014), https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-EstateTax-Statistics-Filing-Year-Table-1.
126 E-mail from Robin K. Roy, Dir., Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Real Property, Trust
& Estate Law to Carlyn S. McCaffrey (Feb. 24, 2015 9:45 AM EST) (on file with author).
127 Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since
1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data 22 tbl. 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20624, 2014), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2014
.pdf.
128 See Leo L. Schmolka, FLPs and GRATs: What to Do?, 86 TAX NOTES 1473
(2000); Mitchell M. Gans, Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Diana S.C. Zeydel, Supercharged
Credit Shelter TrustSM, 21 PROB. & PROP., July/Aug. 2007, at 52 (2007), http://alaskatrust
.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Super-Charged-Credit-Shelter-Trust.pdf.
129 See Ascher, supra note 86, at 73; William S. Blatt, Minority Discounts, Fair Market Value, and the Culture of Estate Taxation, 52 TAX L. REV. 225, 225-26 (1997); Paul L.
Caron & James R. Repetti, Revitalizing the Estate Tax: 5 Easy Pieces, 142 TAX NOTES
1231, 1231-32, 1237-41 (2014); Joseph M. Dodge, A Deemed Realization Approach Is Su-
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of members of the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel along
with members of the American Bar Association’s Tax Section and Real
Property, Probate and Trust Section, the American College of Tax
Counsel, the American Bankers Association and the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants published a 169 page (plus an appendix)
Report on Reform of Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes addressing most of
the system’s problem areas and describing alternatives to dealing with
them.130 Despite all the studies and thousands of pages dedicated to
this topic, most of the same techniques that were available 38 years ago
when Professor Cooper wrote about the voluntary tax are still with us.
There are only three strategies that are no longer available: certain
preferred stock freezes, generation-skipping transfer tax-free direct gifts
to grandchildren and annuities and other benefits under qualified plans.
The original form of preferred stock recapitalization, which permitted
close to zero value common equity subject to a noncumulative class of
preferred stock to be gifted to children, was eliminated by the passage in
1990 of section 2701.131 Direct gifts to grandchildren and other members of their generation and more remote generations have been subject
to the generation–skipping transfer tax since 1986.132 The estate tax exclusion for certain benefits under qualified plans was reduced to
$100,000 in 1982133 and eliminated in 1984.134
The remaining strategies described by Professor Cooper as well as
several others are still available. They fall into two major categories.
One category of techniques is used to shift future wealth; the other is
used to remove existing wealth from the reach of the transfer tax. Let’s
perior to Carryover Basis (and Avoids Most of the Problems of the Estate and Gift Tax),
54 TAX L. REV. 421, 423-24 (2001); Joseph M. Dodge, Colloquium on Wealth Transfer
Taxation: Taxing Gratuitous Transfers Under a Consumption Tax, 51 TAX L. REV. 529,
530, 542, 589 (1996); Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-toValue Lines, 43 TAX L. REV. 241, 243-44 (1988); Graetz, supra note 86, at 259, 268; Harry
L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183,
1185, 1192 (1983); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145, 1147, 1160 (1992); Repetti, supra note 49, at 825-26, 851;
James R. Repetti, The Case For The Estate And Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493, 1493
(2000); Phyllis C. Smith, Change We Can’t Believe In . . . or Afford: Why the Timing is
Wrong to Reduce the Estate Tax for the Wealthiest Americans, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 493,
513-14, 516-17 (2012).
130 See Task Force on Fed. Wealth Transfer Taxes, supra note 113.
131 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 2701(a), 104
Stat. 1388-491, 1388-491-92 (1990). See also Caron & Repetti, supra note 129, at 1235.
132 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, §§ 2601, 2611-13, 100 Stat. 2085,
2718-20 (1986).
133 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248,
§ 245, 96 Stat. 324, 524-25 (1982).
134 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 525, 98 Stat. 494, 873-74
(1984).
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look at what’s available in each category from Professor Cooper’s original list and a few more recently created ones.
First – the shifting of future wealth – by this we mean wealth that is
not yet part of a taxpayer’s transfer tax base because she hasn’t earned it
yet. She hopes to earn it as an investment return on existing assets, by
taking advantage of investment opportunities and by providing services.
If a taxpayer has an investment that she expects will grow in value, and
she wants to keep the wealth out of her transfer tax base, the following
options are available:
1. Gifts
First, she can give the investment to a trust for her children and
more remote descendants. I will assume throughout this discussion that
the beneficiary of any technique I’m discussing will be a trust rather
than children outright. We’re all familiar with the non-tax advantages of
trusts over outright gifts. In the context of tax planning, which is our
focus here, the trust as a donee is preferable to an individual because of
the opportunities the trust presents to keep the transferred assets out of
the transfer tax system for several generations, to permit the taxpayer to
make additional tax free gifts by causing the trust to be treated as a
grantor trust wholly owned by the taxpayer so that she will pay income
taxes on trust income and ultimately to save state and local income
taxes.
If the taxpayer has not used her $5,430,000 lifetime exemption, the
gift can be made free of gift tax. The use of the exemption does not
itself save any future transfer taxes because, unless there’s a concern
that the exemption will be reduced in the future, 100% of the exemption
the taxpayer does not use during her lifetime will be available at death
to shield her assets from estate tax. What the exemption does is permit
a shift of the future return expected from an asset to a trust without
paying any tax for the privilege of making the shift.
The lifetime use of a taxpayer’s $5,430,000, however, isn’t always
without risk. There are at least two reasons for concern. First, if the
property declines in value, the gift will have been counterproductive.
This is so because the donee trust will ultimately have less than
$5,430,000 and the taxpayer’s remaining exemption will not be adjusted
upward to compensate for the loss. If this occurs, the taxpayer would
have been better off if she had retained the asset. The second reason is
a basis concern. Property removed from the transfer tax base will not
have a fair market value basis adjustment at death. This will not matter
if the gifted property is cash or an asset with a fair market value basis so
long as the estate tax rate is higher than the income tax rate. This will
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usually be the case but in today’s environment of lower estate tax rates
and high federal and state income tax rates, this will not always be true.
Consider, for example, a California resident who wants to remove
the future appreciation of a painting from her estate. The painting is
now worth $1,000,000 and has a basis of $1,000,000 but she expects it to
be worth at least $2,000,000 before her death. Her gift of the painting to
her trust can be made tax free and will ultimately save estate taxes of
40% of $1,000,000 or $400,000. But this may not be a good idea. If the
trust is a California trust and if the plan is to sell the painting when the
taxpayer dies, the sale will attract federal and California income taxes of
$452,900. Her trust would have been better off receiving the painting
from her estate.
The income tax issue becomes more of a problem if the asset being
gifted is already appreciated or is subject to debt in excess of basis, socalled negative basis property. To illustrate the issue, consider the possible gift of a zero basis asset worth $1,000,000 to a stateless trust (a trust
that pays no residence-based income tax to any state). If the asset fails
to appreciate after the gift, the gift will have generated no estate tax
savings and will result in an income tax of $238,000. Assuming an income tax rate of 23.8% and an estate tax rate of 40%, the investment
return on the asset would have to reach 147% for the tax results of the
gift to break even with the retention alternative. Suppose that the asset
was subject to a $500,000 debt. If that were the case, the required investment return would be 208% rather than 147%.
If the trust is a grantor trust and if there’s a plan to sell the investment during the taxpayer’s lifetime, the basis issue may not be a problem. Alternatively, if the taxpayer has additional unappreciated assets,
she might sell them to the trust in exchange for the original asset. Although it is possible to purchase the appreciated asset back from the
trust for a note, the tax treatment of the note in the hands of the trustee
after the taxpayer’s death is not clear.
Is there a way to mitigate the downside risk of a lifetime gift? It
may be possible to build enough flexibility into the trust instrument to
permit the gift to the trust to be included in the taxpayer’s gross estate if
it appears that inclusion would produce a better tax result than exclusion. If the property is brought back into the estate tax base, the portion
of the taxpayer’s lifetime exemption used to shield the gift will be restored and the fair market value basis adjustment will be available.
2. Sales and Installment Sales
If the transferee trust has assets, the taxpayer could sell the investment to the trust. So long as the trust is a grantor trust, there will be no
income tax on the sale, although, depending on the nature of the asset,
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there may be sales tax or real property transfer tax.135 The sale of an
investment presents the same market risks and basis risks I discussed in
connection with the use of a gift without the possible opportunity of
reducing the damage by shifting the asset back to the taxpayer’s transfer
tax base.
The sale could be for cash or other property or for a trust obligation. The trust obligation could take the form of a note for a fixed term
and fixed interest rate, a self-cancelling note, a life-time annuity or an
annuity for a term of years that approximates the taxpayer’s life expectancy. In today’s low interest rate environment, the interest rate on a
trust-issued note could be quite low. The applicable rate for this month
(November 2015) for notes of three years or less is .49%, for nine years
or less, it is 1.59%, and for longer than 9 years, it is 2.57%.136 If a selfcancelling note is used there is some current uncertainty as to how it
should be valued. If an annuity instrument is used, the trust will bear
the risk of overpaying if the taxpayer outlives her life expectancy.
If the transfer is to be made in exchange for a trust obligation, there
is an additional risk, particularly if the trust is thinly capitalized, that the
IRS137 will claim that the transfer of the asset has been made in exchange for an interest in the trust rather than for a note. IRS success
with this argument would cause risk under section 2702 that the note
would be treated as having a zero value and that the trust property
would be included in the taxpayer’s gross estate under section 2036. For
the taxpayer who wants to give away future but not current value, the
sale is preferable to the gift because she will retain her current value in
the form of the trust obligation.
3. Preferred Equity Freezes
Preferred freezes are harder to accomplish efficiently since the passage of section 2701 in 1990, but they are still possible. The major requirements are that the common equity must be worth at least 10% at
the inception of the shift and the preferred return must be paid fairly
currently, no later than 4 years after the year it first could have been
paid.
In order to accomplish a preferred freeze, the taxpayer would transfer the investment expected to appreciate to an entity, usually a limited
liability company. The entity would have two classes of interests, one a
135 President Obama’s Revenue Proposal for Fiscal Year 2016, if adopted, would
bring back into the taxpayer’s gross estate the value at the date of death of all property
sold to a grantor trust reduced by the value of the consideration provided by the trust.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 116, at 198.
136 Rev. Rul. 2015-22, 2015-44 I.R.B. 610.
137 References to the “IRS” are to the Internal Revenue Service.
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preferred interest entitling the holder to a fixed return; the other, a
growth interest entitling the holder to 100% of the investment return
above the preferred return. The taxpayer would then either gift or sell
the common interest to her trust. All future growth and appreciation in
the entity above the preferred return would inure to the benefit of the
trust. The disadvantage of this approach over the straight gift or sale is
that the return allocable to the preferred interest is retained by the taxpayer. This retention compares unfavorably with the retention of no
part of the investment return in the case of a gift or sale for cash or
other property. Because the return required on a preferred instrument
is likely much higher than the rate required on a trust obligation, it also
compares unfavorably with the sale for a trust obligation.
The preferred freeze has one important advantage over the gift and
the sale for a taxpayer transferring an appreciated investment. Her basis in the preferred interest will be the same as her basis in the investment. The preferred interest will receive a basis adjustment if she holds
it until death.
4. The Grantor Retained Annuity Trust “GRAT”
The GRAT is a device that became popular after 1977. Ironically,
the popularity was enhanced by the enactment in 1990 of section 2702, a
section that was designed to foreclose the use of grantor retained income trusts because of the uncertainty that the stream of income generated by transferred assets would match the return the IRS was required
to assume in placing a value on the taxpayer’s retained interest. The
beauty of the GRAT provisions and their regulations from the standpoint of the estate planner and her clients was the creation of a statutorily sanctioned method of shifting future appreciation to a children’s
trust without any risk that investment loss or most basis issues would
cause the transaction to be counterproductive and without any risk that
an undervaluation of the transferred asset would expose the taxpayer to
gift tax liability. A taxpayer can create a GRAT by transferring assets
to a trust that requires the annual payment to her of a fixed annuity. If
the regulatory requirements are met, the value of her transfer will be
reduced, for gift tax purposes, by the value of her retained interest. The
value of the retained interest is determined using an IRS prescribed interest rate that varies with the interest rate on mid-term federal obligations. The interest rate for the month of November, 2015 is 2.0%.138 If
the return on the investment exceeds the target interest rate, the excess
will pass gift-tax free to the children’s trust.
138

Rev. Rul. 2015-22, 2015-44 I.R.B. 610.
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The preceding discussion of the gift and the sale does not mention
the valuation risk that both of these techniques cause for any taxpayer
who is giving hard-to-value assets, such as real estate, collectibles and
interests in entities for which there is no regularly established market.
But valuation risk is a real risk for this type of transaction. There are
formula clauses to reduce the level of risk but, for good reason, the IRS
does not like them. The efficient operation of the gift tax depends on
taxpayers taking realistic positions about the value of their gifts. The
IRS lacks the personnel to audit all returns to make sure that taxpayers
are complying with this requirement.139 In order to make compliance
more likely, section 6662(g) imposes a penalty on substantial under-valuations of gifts, ranging from 20% to 40% of the underpayment of gift
tax caused by a substantial gift tax valuation understatement. Good
formula clauses interfere with the operation of the penalty provisions.
If a formula clause works and the IRS successfully challenges the valuation, the clause will either reduce the amount of the transferred property or increase the consideration so that there is ultimately no gift tax
liability. If there is no gift tax liability, there is no penalty. For this
reason, the IRS has consistently attacked these clauses. Although its
recent attacks have failed,140 there is no assurance that it will not ultimately succeed.
139

A 2001 Non-Docketed Service Advice Review opinion as to whether a savings
clause which gifted limited partnership interests to be valued at certain dollar amounts
should be recognized for tax purposes warned against recognizing formula clauses. “To
give substance to this clause effectively nullifies our regulations, defeats the gift tax, obstructs justice and hampers the administration of the tax laws. . . . Fair administration of
the gift tax will become even more difficult if formula clauses are given effect, for scarce
resources cannot reasonably be expended examining returns if the examination will have
no tax effect.” I.R.S. Non-Docketed Service Advice Review, 2001 IRS NSAR 0417, 2001
WL 34056189 at 3-4 (Feb. 27, 2001). I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. Mem. 200122011 at 18 (Feb.
20, 2001) expresses a similar view. “The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 10534,111 Stat. 827 (1997), amended sections 2001, 6501(c)(9) and 7477 of the Code, so that
gifts reported on a return may not be revalued for either gift or estate tax purposes after
the expiration of the gift tax statute of limitations. Returns subject to the Act must now
be examined currently, and no longer may be examined as part of the estate tax examination. Fair administration of the gift tax will become even more difficult if formula clauses
are given effect, for scarce resources cannot reasonably be expended examining returns if
the examination will have no tax effect.” The focus of the opinion and the FSA is on the
lack of tax effect in the short term. In the long term, a formula clause that results in
retention by the transferor of a portion of the property she hoped to transfer or in her
receipt of a larger purchase price is likely to result in larger collections of gift or estate tax
in the future.
140 Estate of Christiansen v. Comm’r, 586 F.3d 1061, 1065-66 (8th Cir. 2009), aff’g 130
T.C. 1 (2008); McCord v. Comm’r, 461 F.3d 614, 632 (5th Cir. 2006), rev’g 120 T.C. 358
(2003); Wandry v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2012-88, 16-22, 25; Hendrix v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2011-133, 22; Estate of Petter v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2009-280, 35, 37, 44.
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It is for this reason that the GRAT technique is particularly useful.
The GRAT regulations specifically permit the taxpayer to retain an annuity interest equal to the full value of the transferred property as finally determined for gift tax purposes.141 As a result, if she undervalues
the gift on her gift tax return and the IRS successfully challenges the
value, the result will be an increase in her annuity payments with no gift
tax liability. The formula by which the GRAT annuity is determined
works the same way as a formula price adjustment clause in an ordinary
sale contract of that type. The difference is that the regulations prevent
the IRS from challenging its use.
The other major advantage of the GRAT is the protection it offers
against investment loss. If the value of a transferred investment declines, the donee or purchasing trust bears the risk of loss. If an investment transferred to a GRAT declines in value, the investment is simply
returned to the taxpayer and can be transferred by her to another
GRAT. The loss protection aspect makes it desirable for taxpayers who
have multiple assets to transfer each asset to a separate GRAT. By doing this, the loss assets will be returned to the taxpayer and will not
depress the investment return of the appreciating assets.
There are two disadvantages to the GRAT compared to the gift and
the sale. First there is mortality risk. If the taxpayer dies during the
term of the GRAT, it is likely that the full value of the GRAT property,
including post transfer appreciation, will be included in the taxpayer’s
gross estate. Second, GRAT profits can generally not be added to a
trust protected from the generation-skipping transfer tax by the allocation of the taxpayer’s GST exemption without diminishing the extent of
the trust’s protection.
If, however, the taxpayer, at the time she is creating a GRAT, has a
trust in existence that is protected from the generation-skipping transfer
tax, it may be possible to avoid both of these disadvantages by creating a
GRAT with a remainder interest that has a small value and then selling
the remainder interest to the protected trust. Arguably, the mortality
risk will be removed by the fact that the taxpayer has made a transfer
for full value. Similarly, the acquisition of the remainder by the protected trust should not affect the extent of its protection because it has
paid full value for the interest.142
President Obama’s advisors are aware of this technique. For the
past several years, his annual revenue proposal has included a provision
to reduce its utility. But this year’s proposal, if enacted, would destroy
141

Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-3(b)(1)(ii)(B).
It is possible that the IRS may reject these arguments, but there is no existing
authority that would support rejection. In any event there is not likely to be any disadvantage to the taxpayer resulting from structuring her GRAT transactions in this way.
142
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it. He has proposed that GRATs must last at least 10 years and may last
no longer than the taxpayer’s life expectancy and that the GRAT remainder have a minimum value of the greater of 25% of the value of the
assets transferred to the GRAT or $500,000.143 These changes would
increase the mortality risk, make it less likely that a transfer to a GRAT
could be made gift tax free, and remove the downside protection that
the GRAT now provides.
For charitably inclined taxpayers, results similar to those achieved
by a GRAT can be achieved through a charitable lead annuity trust (a
“CLAT”). The principal difference between a GRAT and a CLAT is
that the annuity, representing the current value of the asset, is paid to
charity rather than to the taxpayer.
5. Intra-Family Performance of Services and Diversion of
Opportunity
The current gift tax is imposed only on the transfer of property. It
reaches neither the performance of services by a taxpayer nor the diversion of opportunity. A taxpayer, for example, could perform valuable
services for a business or investment entity owned in part or entirely by
her children’s trust. Those services could result in substantial profits to
the entity that it would not have earned without the taxpayer’s help.
Despite the fact that the taxpayer’s services produced value for the
trust, that value will not be subject to gift tax.
Similarly, if a taxpayer because of her position in the community or
in her business or professional area is given the opportunity to make
favorable investments, in many cases, she will be able to arrange for her
children’s trust to make the investment. Because an investment opportunity is not property, the shift will not be subject to the gift tax.
Professor Cooper’s next major category covered techniques that
can be used to remove existing wealth from the taxpayer’s transfer tax
base. There are several of them.
6. Excludable Gifts
Section 2503(b) permits a taxpayer to make gifts of up to $14,000 to
unlimited numbers of individuals each year. The $14,000 amount is subject to periodic inflation adjustments and can be $28,000 for a taxpayer
whose spouse splits gifts with him or her. If a taxpayer has a number of
descendants, she can remove significant wealth from her transfer tax
base each year. I have some clients with sufficient children, grandchildren and great grandchildren to permit them to make more than $1 million of excludable gifts each year. Gifts don’t actually have to be given
143

DEP’T

OF THE

TREASURY, supra note 116, at 198.
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outright to individuals to qualify for the exemption. It is enough to
make the gifts to a trust so long as each individual has a right to withdraw the gift from the trust for at least a limited period of time.144
7. Valuation Discounts
The estate and gift tax regulations adopted a rule that the value of
property for transfer tax purposes is the price a hypothetical willing
buyer would pay to a hypothetical willing seller, neither being under
compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
the relevant facts.145 Using this definition, a fractional interest in a business or investment entity or in a piece of tangible property will not have
a value equal to the entire value of the entity or property multiplied by
the fraction unless the fraction carries with it the right to make decisions
for the whole, such as the right to make investment and distribution
decisions and the right to require the sale of the whole. This is so because, in determining the value of a possible purchase of a fractional
interest, a hypothetical buyer, unrelated to the seller, will not assign any
value to the fact that she and the seller, acting together, could control
these decisions.146
This valuation principal, initially resisted by the IRS but consistently upheld by the courts, makes it possible for a taxpayer to make
value disappear by transferring assets to an entity and then transferring
minority interests in that entity for the benefit of her intended donees.147 The entity transfer could take the form of any one of the transfers I discussed earlier. It could be a gift, perhaps one protected by the
annual gift tax exclusion, a sale, or a transfer to a GRAT. Valuation
discounts of 35% - 40% for this type of gift are common. If the taxpayer
has given away a sufficient portion of the entity during her life so that
she is left with a minority interest at death, the valuation of her remaining interest will also be discounted for estate tax purposes.
8. Qualified Personal Residence Trusts
A qualified personal residence trust (a “QPRT”) permits a taxpayer
to discount, for gift tax purposes, the value of a transfer of her family
residence to a trust for her children by the retained value of her right to
live in it for a number of years and the retained value of her right to get
144 Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968); Cristofani v. Comm’r, 97
T.C. 74, 84-85 (1991).
145 Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2031-1(b), 25.2512-1.
146 See Task Force on Fed. Wealth Transfer Taxes, supra note 113, at 102 n.327.
147 In Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202, the IRS conceded that valuation discounts
for fractional interests in an entity transferred to family members were allowable even
though the family members together controlled the entity after the transfer.

Spring 2015]

WEALTH TRANSFER TAX

33

the house back if she dies within the retained term. The QPRT is a
popular planning technique for taxpayers with valuable homes and insufficient other assets to plan with. If the taxpayer outlives the term of
her trust, the value of the home will be excluded from her wealth transfer tax base. The value of the initial gift of the remainder is, of course,
not excluded, but the balance is. Suppose, for example, that a 50 year
old taxpayer transferred her $1,000,000 home to a 20 year QPRT. She
will have made a taxable gift of the value of the remainder, $559,000 if
the IRS’s interest rate is 1.8% at the time of the transfer. She will have
removed $440,660 from her transfer tax base if she lives for 20 years, as
well as all future appreciation in the value of the residence.
Many people use this fairly simple strategy, including taxpayers
who, in principle, are supporters of the wealth transfer tax system. In
fact, Bloomberg recently reported that former President Bill Clinton
and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton transferred their home in
Chappaqua, New York to QPRTs in 2011.148
9. Use of Grantor Trusts
If a trust is treated as wholly owned by its grantor, it is typically
referred to as a grantor trust. If a trust is a grantor trust, it pays no taxes
on its income. Instead, the grantor pays all the income taxes even
though the income will eventually pass (for example) to her children,
not her. It is simple to arrange for a trust to be both a grantor trust and
a trust that holds assets that will not be includable in the gross estate of
its grantor. A trust is a grantor trust, for example, if the grantor’s
spouse is a trustee with dispositive powers or if a non-trustee, such as
the holder of a power of appointment, can make dispositive decisions
with respect to trust property. Neither of these powers is sufficient to
cause the trust property to be included in the grantor’s gross estate. By
paying income taxes on trust income, the grantor is increasing the value
of trust assets by depleting her own assets that would otherwise have
been included in her gross estate.149
148 Richard Rubin, Wealthy Clintons Use Trusts to Limit Estate Tax They Back,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (June 17, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-06-17/wealthy-clintons-use-trusts-to-limit-estate-tax-they-back (last visited Nov. 16,
2015) (“Bill and Hillary Clinton have long supported an estate tax to prevent the U.S.
from being dominated by inherited wealth. That doesn’t mean they want to pay it.”). But
see Philip Bump, The Clintons Have a Very Complicated Tax Life. Here’s How to Understand It., WASH. POST: THE FIX (June 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
the-fix/wp/2014/06/18/the-clintons-have-a-very-complicated-tax-life-heres-how-to-understand-it/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
149 President Obama’s proposal doesn’t reach this aspect of grantor trust treatment
because it does not discuss the income tax treatment of grantor trusts, except to the
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10. Private Annuities When Annuitant Has Shorter Than Average
Life Expectancy
Section 7520 of the Code requires the IRS to value annuities the
terms of which are determined by the duration of an individual’s or individuals’ lives using tables that reflect mortality assumptions as to the
population as a whole unless the measuring life can be shown to be terminally ill, meaning she has an incurable illness or other deteriorating
physical condition and at least a 50% probability that she will die within
one year.150 This means that the value of an annuity the term of which
is measured by the life of a 50 year old person who has only a 5 year life
expectancy will be valued as if her life expectancy were that of a normal
50 year old – about 30 years. If this 50 year old taxpayer sold $1,000,000
worth of assets to her children’s trusts in exchange for a lifetime annuity
of $44,944 she would not have made a taxable gift because the value of
the right of a 50 year old person with a normal life expectancy to receive
$44,944 for life is worth $1,000,000. If she then dies within the expected
5 years, she will have removed about $775,000 from her taxable estate.
11. Lifetime Taxable Gifts
Most taxpayers are reluctant to make taxable gifts once their exemption has been used because of a reluctance to pay gift taxes. But the
payment of gift taxes is actually a good means of excluding property
from a taxpayer’s transfer tax base. If a taxpayer lives three years after
making taxable gifts, the amount she pays in gift tax will not be included
in her or her spouse’s transfer tax base. This has the effect of lowering
the top marginal estate tax rate from 40% to 28.6%.
12. Use of Dynasty Trusts
All of the techniques I have just discussed remove value from the
taxpayer’s transfer tax base. With careful planning and the judicious use
of her GST exemption, they can be removed from her children’s and
grandchildren’s transfer tax base as well by the use of long-term trusts
established in jurisdictions that have abolished the rule against perpetuities. Current law permits a taxpayer a GST exemption of $5,430,000.
Early use of the exemption in combination with one or more of the techniques I have just discussed can result in a very substantial trust that can
pass down multiple generations without any wealth transfer tax.
President Obama’s revenue proposal would limit the duration of a
GST exemption to 90 years. But even with that limitation, it will often
extent that it recommends prohibiting “the grantor from engaging in a tax-free exchange
of any asset held in the trust.” See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 113, at 198.
150 Treas. Reg. § 25.7520-3(b)(2)(i), (b)(3).
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be possible for property to pass to a taxpayer’s great-grandchildren
without being subject to an additional wealth transfer tax. For many
taxpayers, most of whom will never know their great grandchildren, this
will be sufficient.
THE FUTURE
It is impossible to predict the future of our transfer tax system but I
do have some thoughts to share about future possibilities in light of the
commonly accepted reasons for keeping the system. We’ll look at the
goals of the system and then examine the extent to which the system
fulfills these goals. The advocates of the wealth transfer tax system generally list the following four goals:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Raise revenue,
Increase progressivity of the tax system,
Back-up the income tax, and
Break up concentrations of wealth.

Raising Revenue
In its almost 100-year history, the system has never raised significant revenue when compared to the revenue the federal government
raises from other sources. The wealth transfer tax system’s share of total revenues has ranged from a low of .55% in its first year of existence
to a brief high of almost 10% in the 30s. For most of its life its share has
been less than 2%. The last time its share hit 2% was in fiscal 1977
before the reductions made by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 had come
into effect.151 In fiscal 2013, the most recent year for which these figures
are available, the federal government collected only $19.83 billion in estate and gift taxes out of total revenues of $2.8 trillion, or only .7% of
the whole.152 Given its history and more importantly its recent political
past, it is unlikely that it will ever be responsible for a significant amount
of federal revenue. Even if President Obama’s proposals were adopted,
estate and gift tax revenues would increase to only $35.5 billion, or
about 1.2% of the total.
This, of course, is not a trivial amount. The question is whether the
transfer tax system with all of its separate rules and its separate and
truly intrusive enforcement mechanism is the appropriate source of
these additional amounts. The Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
151 David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate Tax: History, Law, and Economics Table 6.1
(June 14, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=1579829.
152 See infra Appendix, Table 2.
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prepared a report on Fairness and Tax Policy153 for the Senate’s public
hearing on fairness and tax policy that began in March of 2015. Table 4
in that report predicts that in 2015 the 574,000 taxpayers with incomes of
$1,000,000 or more will pay 33.1% of their incomes in taxes.154 The
amount they pay will be about $602 billion. A 1% increase in average
tax rates would completely replace all of the revenue earned from the
wealth transfer tax system in 2013; a 2% increase would replace 2013
revenues plus the additional amount President Obama expects to earn
with his proposed reforms.
INCREASING PROGRESSIVITY
Those who believe a tax system should be progressive generally assume that a dollar has a smaller value to a wealthy person than to a
poorer one. If this is true, social welfare as a whole would be increased
by a tax system that results in a redistribution of income so that on an
after-tax basis taxpayers with the lowest share of total income have a
higher share than they had before taxes.155
Although there is a debate about just how progressive our current
income tax system is, it is a progressive system. Throughout the period
from 1980 to 2011, the post-income tax shares of taxpayers in the bottom four quintiles of income were larger after tax than their before-tax
shares. Conversely, in each of these years, the share of the top quintile
of taxpayers declined on an after-tax basis.156 Similarly the Kawani and
Reynolds-Smolensky progressivity indices show a gradual increase in
progressivity since 1986.157
How does or should the wealth transfer tax system contribute to
progressivity? The estate tax can perhaps be viewed as an additional
income tax, one paid at the time of death on all assets not consumed by
the decedent during her lifetime.158 Seen in this way, the estate tax has
153 See JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, FAIRNESS AND TAX POLICY, JCX-48-15, at 1
(Feb.27, 2015), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4737 (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
154 Id. at 20 tbl. 4.
155 This is assuming there is no additional disutility associated with the process of
taking the dollar and maintaining a system that regularly does this. The current system
maintains a near guarantee of an audit of every estate over $20 million. Each estate that
meets this threshold can reasonably expect their family books and records to be inspected
by the IRS. Even if no additional estate tax is ever due as a result of this intrusive audit,
there must be some significant disutility associated with this sort of invasion of privacy for
either the sake of pursuing revenue or breaking up dynastic wealth. See Repetti, supra
note 49, at 830 (“economist Leon Faucher, who argued that inheritance maximizes utility
because it confers benefits on the transferor and transferee.”)
156 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX’N, JCX-48-15, supra note 153, at 12, tbl.1.
157 Id., at 10, fig.3.
158 Blattmachr & Gans, supra note 115, at 395-96.
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the effect of raising the top income tax bracket from its present 43.4%
(39.6% plus the 3.8% Medicaid tax) to 66.04%.159 The opposing view
would be that the solution to a lack of progressivity in the income tax is
simply to fix the income tax rather than to maintain an entirely different
system.
Some believe that increasing the progressivity of the income tax
system would have the effect of “locking in invested capital and encouraging current consumption rather than savings.”160 The existence of the
estate tax is also thought to encourage current consumption.161 There is
little empirical evidence of either effect. To the extent that higher income tax rates encourage capital lock-in, the elimination of section
1014’s basis step up at death would go a long way toward resolving that
issue.
BACKING –UP

THE

INCOME TAX SYSTEM

Hank L. Gutman, former chief of staff for the Joint Committee of
Taxation, in a 1983 article in the Virginia Law Review, criticized the
income base of our tax system as one bearing little resemblance to what
economists would describe as income.162 Again, if the problem is a
problem with the income tax, why not fix the income tax?
One of Gutman’s major criticisms of the income tax base is its exclusion of gains accruing during a decedent’s lifetime as a result of section 1014’s basis step-up. Ironically, the political justification for
maintaining the basis step-up is the existence of the estate tax. Proponents argue that it would be unfair to subject unrealized appreciation to
two taxes, an income tax and an estate tax. If the wealth transfer tax
system were repealed, the arguments against a basis adjustment system
or even a system of capital gains at death would be much weaker. In
fact, in many of the earlier repeal efforts carryover basis was an integral
part of the proposal.
To the extent that the concern certain trusts and estates attorneys
expressed in 2001 over the possibility that the absence of a gift tax will
encourage taxpayers to make large gifts of appreciated assets to taxpayers in lower tax brackets is a real one,163 simple provisions can be en159 This is the sum of the original 43.4% plus a 40% tax on the 56.6% remaining after
paying the original income tax.
160 Gutman, supra note 129, at 1188.
161 Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE
L.J. 283, 295-96 (1994); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Turning Slogans Into
Tax Policy, 27 VA. TAX REV. 747, 750 (2008) (unsympathetic analysis of the argument).
162 Gutman, supra note 129, at 1189-90.
163 See President’s Tax Relief Proposals, supra note 115 (statement of Lauren Y.
Detzel, Attorney, Dean Mead Egerton Bloodworth Capuano & Bozarth, P.A.).
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acted to reduce the likelihood of these transfers. These provisions could
include, for example, the taxation of the proceeds of a sale of gifted
property by a donee within a fixed number of years after receipt of a gift
as if the sale had been made by the donor. A similar provision was once
applicable to gifts to trusts.164
BREAKING-UP LARGE CONCENTRATION

OF

WEALTH

One of the stated purposes of the wealth transfer tax system is the
destruction of concentrations of wealth.165 Why should this be a goal of
any system? Those that support the break-up of dynastic wealth as a
goal assume its appeal is self-evident. The primary reason offered in
support is the idea that those who control great wealth will be able to
exercise undue political influence. Others concerned with this issue
point out that it is “unclear what kind of equality of political power democracy requires” and that if this is a problem the better solution is to
create a remedy that applies “directly to the use of money for political
purposes.”166 Still others argue that some concentration of wealth in the
hands of private individuals provides a necessary balance against a po164

I.R.C. § 644 (repealed 1997).
Albeit, this occurred at historically varying exemption levels (e.g., originally at
$50,000, going up to $100,000 then back down to $50,000 and then down yet again to
$40,000, where it remained from 1935 until 1942) and at wildly different top rates (starting at 10%, the top rate reached 77% for 36 years, from 1941 to 1977). Taxpayers understandably have a difficult time planning their financial affairs. Death tax proponents
frequently justify the levy by observing that the present exemption is high and would
apply to very few taxpayers. But as long as the tax exists, the levels and rates can be
changed. A taxpayer who is looking to plan her retirement and the succession of a family
farm or business must engage in wasteful planning in order to prepare for the different
scenarios.
In addition, families have to prepare not simply to pay a tax, but also to have their
family enterprise audited. The IRS has allocated substantial resources to auditing estate
tax returns, and it has the discretion to set the levels at which it audits. In 2012, every
estate was subject to a 15% chance of audit, estates over $5 million were audited at a
59% rate, and every single return of an estate over $10 million was audited. G. Michelle
Ferreira & Jeremiah Coder, High Probability of Estate Tax Audit Necessitates Advance
Preparation, GREENBERGTRAURIG (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.gtlaw.com/News-Events/
Publications/Alerts/173590/High-Probability-of-Estate-Tax-Audit-Necessitates-AdvancePreparation (last visited Nov. 16, 2015); see also Richard A. Behrendt, Expect An Audit:
The Estate Tax Audit Rate Is Skyrocketing, WEALTH MANAGEMENT.COM (Feb. 11, 2009),
http://wealthmanagement.com/data-amp-tools/expect-audit-estate-tax-audit-rateskyrocketing (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). Since this is now the exemption level for most
couples, it would be consistent for the IRS to audit practically every single return, as they
could do so with the same resources they already possess. However, if the exemption
level goes back down, there is no guarantee that the IRS will not decide to continue to
audit every return.
166 Thomas Nagel, Liberal Democracy and Hereditary Inequality, 63 TAX L. REV.
113, 118 (2009).
165
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tentially abusive government. Private wealth may be necessary to
counter-balance incumbent elected officials who have the advantage of
speaking from their offices when running for elections.167 It also provides a source for funding a wide variety of charitable activities that are
beneficial to the community at large but might not be supported by the
government. Although destroying wealth concentrations is often stated
to be an important goal of our wealth transfer tax system, as Beckert’s
charts show,168 it has never played a very important role in Congressional decisions to enact or strengthen the system.
The identity of our nation’s most wealthy has been estimated each
year by Forbes magazine since 1982 when it publishes its annual list of
the wealthiest 400 individuals. An examination of these lists through
the years shows a gradual dispersal of wealth and a big turnover. In
2002, for example, Forbes reported that 20 years after its first 400 list
was published only 58 individuals on the original list remained on the
current list.169
The 2014 list was accompanied by what Forbes calls a “self-made
score.” Using this score, only 67 individuals on the current list inherited
what Forbes considers a fortune, and less than half, only 164, had
wealthy parents.170 Going back to the early days of Forbes when it published a rich list of 30 individuals, the descendants of only one of those
individuals seem to have made it to the current list, and only four of the
families of those descendants made it onto Forbes’ 2014 list of the
wealthiest 185 families.171 One of the four families is composed of the
descendants of Henry Phipps, son of a Philadelphia cobbler, and An167 Louis Kaplow, On the Taxation of Private Transfers, 63 TAX L. REV. 159, 171
(2009) (“. . .private concentrations of wealth can also provide useful countervailing power
against abusive government. It may be difficult to unseat entrenched incumbents without
private wealth. Ownership of media outlets by various rich individuals may better enable
them to resist government interference.”); see Karl Zinsmeister, Defending the Kochs: A
History of Big Money & Social Change, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Mar. 13, 2015), http://
www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/03/13/defending_the_kochs_a_history_of_big_
money__social_change_125917.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2015) (“In the end, it was a
handful of major donors who refused to be silenced, backed by thousands of small givers
and volunteers, who brought to fruition the most consequential public-policy reform in
the history of the United States.”); see also McCaffery, supra note 161, at 347 (“Private
wealth can also counterbalance government power, and private investment decisions are
typically more efficient than public ones.”).
168 See BECKERT, supra note 41.
169 See William P. Barrett, The March of the 400, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2002, 12:00 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2002/0930/400080.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
170 See Agustino Fontevecchia, The New Forbes 400 Self-Made Score: From Silver
Spooners to Bootstrappers, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2014, 5:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
afontevecchia/2014/10/02/the-new-forbes-400-self-made-score-from-silver-spooners-toboostrappers/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
171 See Barrett, supra note 169.
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drew Carnegie’s accountant. Based on Forbes’ studies over the past 34
years, there seems to be sufficient social mobility among the very top
layer of our society. Although the estate tax may have accelerated some
of this dispersal, a large part of it is attributable to the sharing of wealth
among multiple generations of descendants. John D. Rockefeller, for
example, has about 200 descendants,172 only one of whom, David Rockefeller, Sr. is on the current 400 wealth list.173
If the destruction of dynastic family wealth is assumed to be a goal
of the tax system, a periodic wealth tax would be a more appropriate
method of accomplishing that. The federal government, however, is
constitutionally prohibited from imposing this tax; imposition of a
wealth tax by the states would have the effect of increasing the current
level of interstate competition for the residence of wealthy individuals.
As a result, a wealth tax seems an unlikely possibility.
It may be that the estate tax is the only practical path to wealth
dispersal. But, in its current form, it can’t do much to achieve this goal
and is probably doing more to promote wealth concentration by encouraging the creation of long term trusts, protected from transfer tax by the
allocation of a transferor’s GST exemption.
The repeal movement is not going away. There are currently at
least 6 bills that have been introduced in Congress this year that would
repeal our wealth transfer tax system.174
For those who would like to see our wealth transfer tax system survive, I’ll conclude by sharing an idea for a somewhat different approach
that addresses what I think are the principal objections to the system,
apart from objections to its complexity, and the compliance burdens it
places on families and on the IRS.
The principal objection to the estate tax is a concern that it stifles
economic growth by discouraging savings and removing capital from the
private sector in order to pay estate taxes and that it causes hardship on
the families of deceased owners of closely held businesses who have to
use resources during life to plan for future estate taxes and who may
ultimately be forced to sell some of their interests in the business or
172 See Carl O’Donnell, The Rockefellers: The Legacy of History’s Richest Man,
FORBES (July 11, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/carlodonnell/2014/07/11/
the-rockefellers-the-legacy-of-historys-richest-man/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
173 See #211 David Rockefeller, Sr., FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/davidrockefeller-sr/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
174 The FairTax [sic] Act of 2015, H.R. 25, 114th Cong. § 103 (2015); The Fair Tax Act
of 2015, S. 155, 114th Cong. § 103 (2015); Death Tax Repeal Act, H.R. 173, 114th Cong.
§ 2 (2015); Farmers Against Crippling Taxes Act, H.R. 186, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Permanently Repeal the Estate Tax Act of 2015, H.R. 725, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); Death
Tax Repeal Act of 2015, H.R. 1105, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). (Since the day this speech
was delivered, H.R. 1105 was passed by the House of Representatives on April 16, 2015).
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assets of the business to pay estate tax obligations.175 Death, after all, is
not a liquidity event.
Removing capital from the private sector was a concern of that first
economist of capitalism, Adam Smith. He characterized these types of
taxes as “more or less unthrifty taxes that increase the revenue of the
sovereign, which seldom maintains any but unproductive labourers at
the expense of the capital of the people, which maintains none but
productive.”176
My idea is not entirely original. It borrows from some earlier income tax proposals such as the USA Tax Plan suggested by Senators
Nunn and Domenici in 1995177 and the Modern Optimal Savings Tax
suggested by David Cay Johnson at the Heckerling Institute on Estate
Planning in 2015.178 It imports these ideas into the estate tax and then
combines them with elements from section 2056A’s qualified domestic
trust. The idea is simple to describe but perhaps complex in actual
application.
175 Of course, more than interests in family businesses might need to be liquidated in
order to pay an estate tax. Family secrets, and private videos such as those that might
comprise a component of the right of publicity, are also fair game for the estate tax under
I.R.C. § 2033. Estate of Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1279, 1288-89 (E.D. Va.
1994). This could mean that the IRS has the right to review the personal files of the
decedent to determine the correct valuation of the right. See Ray D. Madoff, Taxing
Personhood: Estate Taxes and The Compelled Commodification Of Identity, 17 VA. TAX
REV. 759, 798 (1998); see also Paul Caron, Estate Planning Implications of the Right of
Publicity, 68 TAX NOTES 95, 97 (1995) (“The cash-strapped heirs would be hard pressed
in this situation to respect the decedent’s privacy wishes that the right of publicity is
designed to protect. Proper planning for the publicity-shy celebrity may be to impose
restrictions on the right of publicity to accord with his privacy interests without subjecting
the heirs to an estate tax burden.”); Mitchell M. Gans, Bridget J. Crawford & Jonathan
G. Blattmachr, Postmortem Rights of Publicity: The Federal Estate Tax Consequences of
New State-Law Property Rights, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 203, 203-05 (2008) (noting
that the first Playboy centerfold was a nude of Marilyn Monroe the posthumous publication of which her heir was unable to enjoin. Had her heir had the right, the value of it
would be included in the estate, regardless of her desire not to exercise it; and suggesting
that statutes be rewritten to “limit a decedent’s ability to control the disposition of any
postmortem rights of publicity”); David Horton, Indescendibility, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 543,
595-96 (2014) (“their estate tax liability may be so large that their personal representative
will need to sell their publicity rights to pay it - resulting in the very exploitation of their
image that they assiduously avoided while alive.”).
176 SMITH, supra note 1, at 814.
177 USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. § 50 (1995). The “USA” stands for
“unlimited savings allowance.”
178 David Cay Johnston A Transfer Tax for the 21st Century Economy, 49 U. MIAMI
HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. ch. 11 (Lloyd Leva Plaine Distinguished Lecture,
2015); see also David Cay Johnston, An Estate and Gift Tax for the 21st Century Economy, 146 TAX NOTES 547, 547-48 (Jan. 26, 2015).
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Under this proposal, a decedent’s executor would have the option
of deferring the estate tax on selected assets provided they were placed
in a qualified trust. I’ll refer to this type of trust as a “Capital Preservation Trust.” Because the principal object of the proposal is to prevent
the estate tax from discouraging and interfering with the formation and
preservation of capital stock and the transmission of family businesses
to the next generation, the assets permitted to be placed in a Capital
Preservation Trust (a “CPT”) would be investment and business assets.
Personal assets, such as art and antiques and the like and real estate
used for personal purposes, would not be permitted investments of a
CPT. Assets placed in a CPT would not be subject to the estate tax until
they were removed from the trust. The removed assets would be subject
to estate tax at the rate they would have been subject to if they had not
been placed in a CPT at the original decedent’s death. Income tax
would be imposed on a CPT in a manner similar to the tax currently
imposed on an electing small business trust (an “ESBT”) at the highest
marginal rate bracket179 except that there would be no tax on unrealized
appreciation at the death of the decedent unless, as a separate matter,
the basis adjustment rules of section 1014 are repealed. Distributions to
beneficiaries would not be subject to income tax but would be subject to
the deferred estate tax.
Presumably distributions would not occur until beneficiaries are
ready to convert investment assets to personal use. The conversion
would generally cause a liquidity event. At that point imposing an estate tax would no longer interfere with the nation’s stock of investment
capital. To protect the government’s interests in ultimately receiving the
payment of estate taxes, a CPT would have to have either an institutional trustee with the power to withhold taxes from distributions or
would have to provide some kind of security to the government. In order to satisfy at least partially the proponents of the wealth transfer tax
system who advocate it as a means of preventing dynasties from exerting
undue political influence, safeguards could be put in place to prevent
assets held in a CPT to be used for lobbying or other political purposes.
There are two principal distinctions between this approach and the
type of deferral now permitted under section 6166. First, the scope of
the deferral is much broader. It would not be limited to closely held
business interests. It would apply to all kinds of investment assets that
are productively deployed. Second, the risk of future investment loss as
well as possible future investment gain would be shared between the
government and the decedent’s beneficiaries.

179

I.R.C. § 641(c)(1)-(2).
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The fact that this proposal would permit the families of decedents
to keep their investments in the capital market should remove one of
the principal objections to the wealth transfer tax system. And, if the
investments or businesses prosper, the government would share in the
family’s prosperity.180
CONCLUSION
Whether this idea would appeal to either the opponents or the proponents of the wealth transfer tax system is hard to predict. I’m just
dropping another idea into the hopper of potential solutions to compete
with repeal, capital gains at death and a possible exchange of the estate
tax for an inheritance tax.181
What I can say is that debate over the future of the transfer tax
system is likely to rage on for the rest of my professional career and the
careers of a good many of you in the audience. The debate is probably
good for us on a number of levels. It gives us plenty of interesting ideas
to debate and talk about. And the legislative changes that seem to appear with increasing frequency prevent our clients from letting their estate plans grow stale.

180 The CPT would also help ameliorate the problems associated with taxing the descendible right of publicity. See Madoff, supra note 175, at 798, 810. The right of publicity could remain in the CPT unused if the decedent or heirs did not wish to exploit the
family memories and secrets. If, however, the family later decided to sell them, the government would then get its due.
181 Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a Comprehensive Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. REV. 1, 2-3, 87 (2009).

[2]

# Deaths

1,001,921
1,142,558
1,343,356
1,417,269
1,452,454
1,711,982
1,921,031
1,989,841
2,148,463
2,403,351
2,416,425
2,443,387
2,448,288
2,397,615
2,448,017
2,426,264
2,423,712
2,471,984
2,437,163
2,468,435
2,515,458

[1]

Year

1916
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

2,365
12,483
8,139
19,044
31,896
69,405
149,432
145,617
63,988
121,715
120,576
92,679
73,340
65,703
58,000
49,924
46,251
47,320
28,780
11,128
26,859

#
Returns*

[3]

[4]
%
Returns
of
Deaths
0.24%
1.09%
0.61%
1.34%
2.20%
4.05%
7.78%
7.32%
2.98%
5.06%
4.99%
3.79%
3.00%
2.74%
2.37%
2.06%
1.91%
1.91%
1.18%
0.45%
1.07%
50,000
50,000
100,000
40,000
60,000
60,000
60,000
161,563
600,000
675,000
675,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
2,000,000
3,500,000
repealed
$ 5,000,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Exemption
Amount

[5]

1,085,945
593,400
1,417,580
676,360
589,380
479,880
366,060
464,170
1,086,600
928,125
902,475
1,316,000
1,287,000
1,879,500
1,818,000
2,348,000
2,284,000
2,198,000
3,860,500
repealed
$ 5,260,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Inflation
Adjusted
to 2014 $

[5a]

[6]
Top
Estate
Tax
Bracket
10%
25%
20%
70%
77%
77%
77%
70%
55%
55%
55%
49%
49%
48%
47%
46%
45%
45%
45%
repealed
35%

APPENDIX TABLE 1

5,000,000
10,000,000
10,000,000
50,000,000
10,000,000
10,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
repealed
$ 5,000,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

At Taxable
Estate of

[7]

108,594,500
118,680,000
141,758,000
845,450,000
98,230,000
79,980,000
61,010,000
14,365,000
5,433,000
4,125,000
4,011,000
3,948,000
3,861,000
3,759,000
3,636,000
3,522,000
3,426,000
3,297,000
3,860,500
repealed
$ 5,260,000

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

Inflation
Adjusted
to 2014 $

[7a]

21.719
11.868
14.1758
16.909
9.823
7.998
6.101
2.873
1.811
1.375
1.337
1.316
1.287
1.253
1.212
1.174
1.142
1.099
1.103
1.086
1.052

Inflation
Adjusted
to 2014 $

[8]
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Nat’l Vital Stat. Rep., Number of Deaths, Death Rates, and Age-Adjusted Death Rates, by Race and Sex: United States 1940,
1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980-2013 (p. 4, Tab. 1), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_02.pdf (last visited Nov. 16,
2015); U.S. Dep’t of Comm., Mortality Statistics 1931 (p. 5, Tab. D), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/vsushistorical/mortstatsh_1931.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).

Col. 7

Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety Years and Counting (p. 122, Fig. D), https:/
/www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ninetyestate.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).

Cols. 3-6 David Joulfaian, The Federal Estate Tax: History, Law and Economics (p. 2-6, Tab. 3.1; p. 4-4, Tab. 4.1) http://
news.heartland.org/sites/default/files/joulfaian_ssrn-id1579829.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). For the years 1916-1930,
Kathy Medve, Estate Tax Returns Revisited, 1916-1931 (p. 68, Tab. 1), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/16-31estxrtre.pdf (last
visited Nov. 16, 2015).

Col. 2

Sources:
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AND

TYPE
OF

(2)

56,174,937

Excise taxes

61,033,674

19,830,148
14,051,771
5,778,377

884,440,425
830,291,842
54,148,583
7,895,992
5,510,733

772,464,824
728,688,235
43,776,589
7,158,984
4,773,045
14,450,249
12,340,655
2,109,594

897,847,151

1,564,354,494
1,123,453,881
416,204,540
24,696,073

311,993,954
311,432,736
561,218

784,396,853

1,387,836,515
1,038,019,224
333,383,066
16,434,225

281,461,580
280,965,136
496,445

2,855,059,420

(1)
2,524,320,134

2013

2.1

0.7
0.5
0.2

31.0
29.1
1.9
0.3
0.2

31.4

54.8
39.3
14.6
0.9

10.9
10.9
[3]

100.0

(3)

Percentage
of 2013 total

1,137,764

1,047,329
963,243
84,086

6,156,524
n.a.
n.a.
146,745
72,456

6,375,725

314,223,682
n.a.
n.a.
1,448,544

41,569,223
n.a.
n.a.

364,353,723

(4)

2013

Refunds [1, 2]

TAX, FISCAL YEARS 2012

Gross collections [1]

BY

2012

REFUNDS,

Estate and gift taxes
Estate
Gift [7]

Employment taxes
Old-Age, Survivors, Disability,
and Hospital Insurance (OASDHI), total [5]
Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)
Self-Employment Insurance Contributions Act (SECA)
Unemployment insurance
Railroad retirement

Individual and estate and trust income taxes [4, 5]
Individual income tax withheld
Individual income tax payments [6]
Estate and trust income tax

Business income taxes
Corporation
Tax-exempt organization unrelated business income tax

United States, total

Type of tax

TABLE 2. COLLECTIONS

2013

59,895,910

18,782,819
13,088,528
5,694,291

878,283,901
n.a.
n.a.
7,749,247
5,438,277

891,471,426

1,250,130,812
n.a.
n.a.
23,247,529

270,424,731
n.a.
n.a.

2,490,705,698

(5)

2013

2.4

0.8
0.5
0.2

35.3
n.a.
n.a.
0.3
0.2

35.8

50.2
n.a.
n.a.
0.9

10.9
n.a.
n.a.

100.0

(6)

Percentage
of 2013 total

Net collections [1]

AND
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SOURCE: Chief Fin. Officer, Fin. Mgmt., https://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Collections-and-Refunds,-by-Type-of-Tax-IRS-Data-Book-Table-1 (last visited Nov. 16,
2015).

Partnership and S corporation data are not shown in this table since these entities generally do not have a tax liability. Instead, they pass any profits or losses to the
underlying owners, who include these profits or losses on their income tax returns.

Collection and refund data may not be comparable for a given fiscal year because payments made in prior years may be refunded in the current fiscal year.

Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.

NOTES:

[7] The American Taxpayer Relief Act (ATRA) of 2012 extended the $5 million gift tax exemption level that was established under the Tax Relief, Unemployment
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010. The ATRA extended portability rules related to the passing of an exemption amount from a decedent to a
surviving spouse and indexed the exemption amount to inflation. These tax law changes may have encouraged increased gifting in Fiscal Year 2012, which is reflected in the
Fiscal Year 2013 gift tax collections.

[6] Includes collections of estimated income tax and payments included with individual income tax return filings.

[5] Collections of withheld individual income tax are not reported by taxpayers separately from Old-Age, Survivors, Disability, and Hospital Insurance (OASDHI) taxes on
salaries and wages (under the Federal Insurance Contributions Act or FICA) and on self-employment income (under the Self-Employment Insurance Contributions Act or
SECA). The OASDHI tax collections and refunds shown in this table are based on estimates made by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to the provisions of Section 201
(a) of the Social Security Act as amended and include all OASDHI taxes. Amounts shown for individual income tax withheld and individual income tax payments were
derived by subtracting the FICA and SECA tax estimates from total individual income tax withheld and individual income tax payments. Refund estimates, and, therefore,
net collection estimates, were not made for the components of income and OASDHI taxes.

[4] Collections include Presidential Election Campaign Fund contributions of $37.3 million for Fiscal Year 2012. Beginning with Fiscal Year 2013, Presidential Election
Campaign Fund contributions are no longer included in Internal Revenue Service collections, but instead are reported separately in the U.S. Treasury Department
collections.

[3] Less than 0.05 percent.

[2] Includes overpayment refunds, refunds resulting from examination activity, refundable tax credits, and other refunds required by law. Also includes $2.8 billion in
interest, of which $0.8 billion was paid to corporations and $2.0 billion was paid to all others (related to individual, employment, estate, gift and excise tax returns).

[1] Excludes credits to taxpayer accounts, as well as excise taxes paid to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau.

n.a.—Not available.
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